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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 960384-CA 
CONRAD STERKEL and : Priority No. 15 
WILLIAM A. PICKETT, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Seventh District Court ruling, see 
Addendum A, denying Appellants' motion to dismiss citations written 
by Utah Division of Parks and Recreation personnel charging 
Appellants with violation of Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7(1) (Supp. 
1996). Appellants eventually pleaded no contest. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1996), this Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that the State of Utah 
has general jurisdiction to enforce its laws within the Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area (GCNRA) on Lake Powell? 
2. Did the trial court correctly hold that to register boats 
located within GCNRA the State of Utah may require payment of Utah 
1 
property taxes on those boats despite assertions that federal law 
preempts such registration and taxation? 
3. Did the trial court correctly hold that payment of 
property taxes on boats located within GCNRA does not impermissibly 
interfere with interstate commerce or otherwise violate the Federal 
Commerce Clause? 
Each of these issues presents a question of law; the trial 
court's decision is therefore reviewed for correctness by this 
Court- Utah v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "[The Congress 
shall have the power t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;" 
The U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 17 provides: 
[The Congress shall have to power t]o exercise 
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over 
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as 
may, by cession of particular States, and the 
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the 
government of the United States, and to exercise 
like authority over all places purchased by the 
consent of the Legislature of the State in which 
the same shall be, for the erection of forts, 
magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful 
buildings; 
2 
4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), a portion of the Federal Buck Act, 
provides: 
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability 
for payment of, collection of, or accounting for 
any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any 
duly constituted taxing authority therein, having 
jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that 
the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is 
levied, occurred in whole or in part within a 
Federal area; and such State or taxing authority 
shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and 
collect any such tax in any Federal area within 
such State to the same extent and with the same 
effect as though such area was not a Federal area. 
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be 
applicable only with respect to sales or purchases 
made, receipts from sales received, or storage or 
use occurring, after December 31, 1940. 
46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994), a portion of the Federal Boat Safety 
Act, provides: 
The authority issuing a number under this 
chapter may prescribe regulations and establish 
fees to carry out the intent of this chapter. The 
fees shall apply equally to residents and 
nonresidents of the State. A State issuing 
authority may impose only conditions for vessel 
numbering that a r e — 
(1) prescribed by this chapter or regulations 
of the Secretary about the standard numbering 
system; or 
(2) related to proof of payment of State or 
local taxes. 
36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995), a portion of National Park Service, 
Department of Interior, regulations provides: 
(a) In addition to the regulations contained 
in this part, Title 14 United States Code, Title 33 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 Code of 
Federal Regulations, and the laws and regulations 
3 
of the State within whose exterior boundaries a 
park area or portion thereof is located shall 
govern water use, vessels, and their operation and 
are adopted as part of these regulations. 
(b) As adopted herein, Federal regulations 
authorizing an action by the "captain of the port" 
or another officer or employee of the United States 
Coast Guard, authorize a like action by the 
superintendent. 
33 C.F.R. § 174.31 (1995), a portion of the Coast Guard, 
Department of Transportation, regulations provides: 
A State numbering system may condition the 
issuance of a certificate of number o n — 
(a) Title to, or other proof of ownership of a 
vessel except a recreational-type public vessel of 
the United States; or 
(b) The payment of State or local taxes, 
except for a recreational-type public vessel of the 
United States. 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act, 86 Stat. 1311 (1972) 
(for full text, see Addendum B, p. B-l); and, 
Utah Boating Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-18-1 to -23 (Supp. 
1996) (for full text, see Addendum B, p. B-4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with failure to register their boats 
as required by the Utah Boating Act, Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7 
(Supp. 1996). They were convicted based on their no contest pleas, 
4 
see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(3) (1995) .x This timely appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, who are not Utah residents, are private 
recreationalists operating within GCNRA in the same manner as other 
members of the general public who recreate there. They have 
operated and maintained boats on Lake Powell, within GCNRA, for 
more than ten years without appropriate Utah registration (Sterkel 
R. 2, 3; Pickett R. 36, 37). Because of the size of Appellants' 
boats, the boats are more or less permanently moored at Lake Powell 
in a marina operated by a GCNRA concessionaire. Id. 
In 1994, a Utah Division of Parks and Recreation ranger cited 
Appellants for violating Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7(1) (Supp. 1996), 
which provides that "(e)ach motorboat...on the waters of this state 
shall be registered, unless it is exempt from registration...." Id. 
"Waters of this State" means "any waters within the territorial 
limits of the state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-2(14) (Supp. 1996). 
Appellants' boats are not exempt from registration under the 
statute. 
1
 The State acknowledges that, as Appellants assert, these 
pleas were entered conditionally, to preserve Appellants' 
opportunity to withdraw the pleas if Appellants are successful 
with this appeal. See, Sterkel Record (hereafter referred to as 
"Sterkel R.") at 177/ Pickett Record (hereafter referred to as 
"Pickett R.") at 116. 
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The procedure for registering boats in Utah is like the 
process used for motor vehicles. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7 
(Supp. 1996). The required hull numbers are the equivalent of a 
license plate.2 Property tax payment is a prerequisite for boat 
registration. Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7 (c) (Supp. 1996). In this 
case, Appellants have failed to pay their property taxes and have 
failed to register their boats in Utah (Sterkel R. 2, 3; Pickett R. 
36, 37). They were charged with violating the state's registration 
statute and were convicted based on their no contest pleas 
(Sterkel R. 177; Pickett R. 116). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants have attempted to narrowly frame the issues 
presented to this Court, asserting that Utah lacks jurisdiction 
over them only to the extent they are engaged in recreational 
boating activities within GCNRA. While Appellants' case arises in 
the boating context, in reality the effect of their assertions 
could be much greater. Indeed, if Appellants' arguments are 
followed to their "logical" conclusion, Utah's jurisdiction to 
carry out many governmental functions within GCNRA (some 1.25 
A boat with a valid marine document issued by the United 
States Coast Guard (a "Coast Guard documented vessel") is exempt 
from Utah number display requirements, Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7 
(5) (Supp. 1996), because it has another means of identification 
(hailing name and port of call on the rear of boat). Such boats, 
however, are not exempt from state registration. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-18-7(1) (Supp. 1996). 
6 
million acres) could abruptly vanish. This is a large price to pay 
to free Appellants from the responsibility of paying property taxes 
on their boats as required by state and federal law. 
Appellants make four arguments on appeal. First, that the 
State lacks jurisdiction to enforce its recreational boating laws 
within GCNRA. This argument fails because Utah has general 
jurisdiction to enforce its law within GCNRA and has never ceded 
any portion of that jurisdiction to the Federal Government. 
Second, Appellants assert that Congress and the Executive 
Department have preempted Utah from regulating boat registration 
within GCNRA. This argument fails because it ignores established 
legal tests for determining exclusivity of federal jurisdiction. 
It also fails because federal law expressly provides for precisely 
the type of vessel regulation Utah implements. 
Third, Appellants contend that national interests are advanced 
by exclusive federal regulation of recreational boating within 
GCNRA. This argument is incorrect because no such interests exist. 
Finally, Appellants allege that Utah's requirement of property 
tax payment before boat owners operating at Lake Powell may 
register boats violates the Commerce Clause of the United States' 
Constitution. This argument fails because the boats being 
registered and taxed have "come to rest" and are no longer "in" 
interstate commerce, and because Utah's property tax requirement 
creates no impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 
7 
For all of these reasons, the trial court's finding that Utah 
has jurisdiction to enforce its boating regulations at GCNRA should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH HAS GENERAL JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE 
ITS LAWS WITHIN THE GLEN CANYON NATIONAL 
RECREATION AREA (GCNRA) 
When Utah became a State in 1896, it acquired general 
jurisdiction to enforce its laws on federal land within its 
territorial borders, including the area that later became GCNRA. 
See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 508-16 (1896); Bacon 
v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 314-16 (1906); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 
U.S. 46, 89-94 (1907); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 242, 246 
(1918); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542-43 (1976); 
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580-
81 (1987) . Since statehood, Utah has not ceded any portion of its 
jurisdiction over GCNRA to the Federal Government. 
Limited cessions of jurisdiction have occurred for some 
federal areas in the State. For example, Utah has ceded 
jurisdiction to the United States over all lands within the limits 
of the Fort Douglas and Fort Duchesne Military Reservations. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-8-3 (1993). Even within these areas, however, Utah 
"retains concurrent jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, . . . 
over [the] lands" and reserves to itself "the right to impose taxes 
8 
on individuals . . . in respect to . . . any property . . . 
situated on those lands." Utah Code Ann, § 63-8-4 (1993). 
Appellants contend there is exclusive federal jurisdiction at 
GCNRA to regulate public recreational boating. To attempt to make 
their argument more plausible they obfuscate two issues, combining 
them into one. For analytical and legal reasons, these issues must 
be separated. The first is whether Utah has jurisdiction within a 
geographic area (in this case GCNRA) ; the second is whether the 
State has jurisdiction to regulate a particular activity (here 
recreational boating). 
Richardson v. Turner, 16 Utah 2d. 371, 401 P.2d 443 (1965), is 
dispositive concerning Utah's jurisdiction over the geographic area 
known as GCNRA. That case addressed whether Dugway Proving 
Grounds, a federal military base, was an area of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. There, Appellants asserted that because the United 
States always had a proprietary interest in the land underlying the 
base, the withdrawal of the area from the public domain for 
military use made the base an area of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument based 
upon a three-pronged test. The Court stated: 
Exclusive jurisdiction over lands situated within the 
boundaries of a state vests in the United States in one 
of three ways: 
(1) Transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article I, § 8, clause 17 of the United States 
* Constitution; 
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(2) By cession from the state to the federal 
government and proper acceptance and 
notification for the latter, and 
(3) Reservation by the federal government upon 
admission of a state into the Union. 
Richardson, 401 P.2d at 444 (citations omitted). The Court held 
that none of the conditions had occurred. If the proponents of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction at Dugway, a military enclave, were 
unable to validate their exclusive federal jurisdiction claims, a 
fortiori Appellants' assertions concerning a federal recreation 
area also fail. 
Indeed, regardless of the federal involvement at GCNRA which 
Appellants describe, GCNRA meets no aspect of the Richardson test. 
Concerning the first prong, Appellants do not, and cannot, argue 
that there has been a transfer of jurisdiction over GCNRA under the 
"Enclave Clause" of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, 
cl. 17, because no such transfer has taken place. 
Concerning the second Richardson prong, exclusive federal 
jurisdiction requires a cession from the State to the Federal 
Government, and an acceptance of that cession by the United States. 
Federal law is specific. It says: 
[T]he obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United 
States over lands . . . shall not be required; but the 
head . . . of an agency . . . at such time as he may deem 
desirable, accept or secure from the State in which any 
lands . . . under his immediate . . . control are 
situated . . . consent to or cession of such 
jurisdiction, exclusive or partial . . . over any such 
lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate 
acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United 
10 
States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the 
Governor of such State or in such other matter as may be 
prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are 
situated. Unless and until the United States has 
accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired 
as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no 
such jurisdiction has be accepted. 
40 U.S.C. § 255 (1994) (emphasis added). Appellants allege no 
facts to substantiate compliance with the requirements of this 
statute concerning GCNRA, and none exist. Federal cases have 
interpreted strictly the steps that must be taken to comply with 
this statute. See, e.g., United States v. D.K. Johnson, 994 F.2d 
980, 985 (2nd Cir. 1993) . In short, Utah has never ceded 
jurisdiction over property, persons, or activities within GCNRA to 
the Federal Government, and the United States has never accepted 
such a cession. 
Likewise, Appellants cannot meet the third prong of the 
Richardson test, because neither GCNRA, nor any reservation of 
federal land related to it, existed when Utah became a State in 
1896.3 Thus, Appellants fail each aspect of the Richardson test 
with respect to GCNRA, and Richardson disposes of their claims that 
GCNRA is a geographic area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
3
 GCNRA was created in 1972. Glen Canyon Recreation Area 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-593, 86 Stat. 1311. 
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II. UTAH HAS NOT BEEN PREEMPTED FROM 
REGULATING BOAT REGISTRATION WITHIN THE GCNRA 
DUE TO ACTIONS BY CONGRESS OR THE EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT 
Appellants were charged with failure to register their boats 
moored at Lake Powell, within GCNRA, and were convicted based on 
their no contest pleas. Appellants assert that the Federal 
Government exclusively regulates recreational boating activities 
within GCNRA. Appellants are simply wrong. 
Federal regulations require a boat to acquire its number in 
the "state in which it is principally used." 33 C.F.R. § 173.15 
(1995). The boats in question here are used principally in Utah, 
where payment of boat property tax is a prerequisite for 
registration. Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7(2) (Supp. 1996). 
Collection of such a tax is permitted under federal law. The 
Federal Boat Safety Act, which refers to boat registration as 
"number issuing," provides that: 
The authority issuing a number under this chapter may 
prescribe regulations and establish fees to carry out the 
intent of this chapter. The fees shall apply equally to 
residents and nonresidents of the State. A State issuing 
authority may impose . . . conditions for vessel 
numbering that are-
. . . . 
(2) related to proof of payment of State or 
local taxes. 
46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994) . Utah is a number-issuing authority under 
federal rules. See 33 C.F.R. § 173, Appendix A (1995). Coast 
Guard regulations mirror the Boat Safety Act. They provide: 
12 
A State numbering system may condition the issuance of a 
certificate of number on-
(b) The payment of State or local taxes, 
except for a recreational-type public vessel 
of the United States. 
33 C.F.R. § 174,31 (1995). 
The Federal Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), recognizes the 
States' authority to collect taxes in federal areas. The Buck Act 
provides, in part: 
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for 
payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or 
use tax levied by any State, or by a duly constituted 
taxing authority therein . . . on the ground that the 
sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, 
occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area: and 
such State or taxing authority shall have full 
jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax 
in any Federal area within such State to the same extent 
and with the same effect as though such area was not a 
Federal area. 
4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (emphasis added). For the purpose of the Buck 
Act, "sales or use tax" is defined, in part, as "use of tangible 
personal property . . . ." 4 U.S.C. § 110 (b) (1994). 
Federal regulations also support Utah's authority to register 
all boats within their borders, including boats located within 
federal recreation areas. Current National Park Service 
regulations that apply to GCNRA provide, in part: 
(a) In addition to . . . [federal] regulations contained 
in this part . . . the laws and regulations of the State 
within whose exterior boundaries a park area or portion 
thereof is located shall govern water use, vessels, and 
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their operation and are adopted as part of these 
regulations. 
36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995). 
Against this backdrop, Appellants were charged with and 
convicted for failure to register their boats in Utah. Unable to 
successfully argue that Utah lacks all jurisdiction within the 
geographic area known as GCNRA, Appellants attempt to mix their 
geographic jurisdiction arguments with assertions that regulation 
of recreational boating activities within GCNRA has been preempted 
by federal law. Appellants are simply wrong in this creative, but 
misguided, effort. 
The United States Supreme Court has identified three types of 
federal preemption of state law: express, implied field, and 
implied conflict. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management 
Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). Appellants allege all three, but 
they fail to show how any one has occurred here, and none has. 
When examining preemption issues, the United States Supreme 
Court starts with a "strong presumption against pre-emption," 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992). The 
Utah Supreme Court has said "preemption analysis ^starts with the 
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state 
law.'" Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942, 945 (1994), 
(citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). To rebut 
this presumption, there must be a showing that Congress' "clear and 
manifest" purpose was to preempt. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
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While this intention may be express or implied, "it is not lightly 
to be presumed." Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d at 945 
(citing Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade v. District of Columbia, 948 
F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Alessi v. Raybestsos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)). 
The burden is on the party claiming preemption to show a clear 
congressional intention to oust the state from the exercise of 
powers otherwise available to it. Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 
869 P.2d at 945 (citing Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortie, 501 
U.S. 597, 605 (1991)(citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230/ Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. Abrams, 899 F.2d 1315, 1219 (2nd Cir. 
1990)). When evaluated with these strong presumptions in mind, 
Appellants' preemption claims fail. 
1. EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF UTAH BOAT REGISTRATION LAWS HAS 
NOT OCCURRED 
It makes no sense whatsoever for Appellants to argue that Utah 
is expressly preempted from carrying out boat regulation activities 
at GCNRA in face of federal laws and regulations that dovetail 
precisely with the very type of boat registration program the State 
has adopted. 
At least three distinct federal laws or regulations expressly 
allow for Utah's system of boat registration, including taxation of 
boats, to operate within GCNRA. The Federal Boat Safety Act allows 
States to impose conditions for vessel registration that are 
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"related to proof of payment of State . . . taxes." 46 U.S.C. § 
12307 (1994). United States Coast Guard regulations likewise 
provide that a State may "condition the issuance of a 
(registration) certificate...on...the payment of State...taxes." 
33 C.F.R. § 174.31 (1995). National Park Service regulations which 
apply to GCNRA provide that "the laws and regulations of the State 
within whose exterior boundaries a park area...is located shall 
govern.. .vessels [] and their operation and are adopted as part of 
these regulations." 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995). It is difficult to 
see how any preemption argument can be sustained in light of these 
expressions of federal law, especially when the strong presumption 
against preemption is taken into account. 
Appellants' reliance to the contrary on Shields v. Outboard 
Marine Corp., 116 F.Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991), is inappropriate. 
Shields held that state law is only preempted with respect to boat 
safety equipment requirements, and then only when state law 
directly conflicts with federal law. See id. at 1582. And, the 
Shields court explicitly said Congress did not "intend to occupy 
the entire field of boat safety regulation." Id. 
To attempt to bolster their express preemption argument, 
Appellants cite to certain federal agency boat regulations. 
Appellants' Brief at 7. But Appellants pick and choose the 
regulations they refer to, and they cannot cite any regulatory 
language explicitly preempting state law. The Tenth Circuit Court 
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of Appeals said, "[a]s far as results are concerned, neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Circuit has found pre-emption by federal 
regulation since Fidelity Federal unless the agency has made an 
explicit statement." Integrity Management Intern v. Tombs & Sons, 
836 F.2d 485, 493 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The simple 
existence of certain federal boat safety regulations, then, cannot 
by itself establish an express intent by Congress to preempt state 
law concerning boat regulation. Consequently, Appellants fail to 
show express federal preemption of state boat registration laws 
within GCNRA. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING NO CONFLICT 
BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
The trial court correctly held that Appellants have not 
"identified any conflict between federal laws and regulations and 
the state laws in question here." Utah v. Sterkel, No. 9417-156 
(7th Cir. Utah) (Addendum A at A-2) . The court was correct that 
conflict preemption does not apply in this case because: (1) 
Appellants demonstrate no conflict between state and federal law 
and (2) the operation of state law does not frustrate the 
accomplishment of any federal objective. 
In United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a county could tax the 
housing of federal employees who lived in national forests located 
within the county. Id. at 456, 457-68. The Court concluded that 
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state laws providing for taxation of housing were not preempted by 
extensive federal regulation and management of the area where the 
housing was located. By contrast, federal statutes and regulations 
at issue here expressly provide for the very type of regulation and 
taxation Appellants assert is preempted.4 Nor does the State's 
boat registration law interfere in any way with the United States' 
ability to manage GCNRA under any statutory or constitutional 
provision. 
Finally, a principle of statutory construction supports the 
State's position. The United States Supreme Court said: 
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and 
has included in the enacted legislation a provision 
explicitly addressing the issue, and when that provision 
provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent 
with respect to state authority," Malone v. White Motor 
Corp., 435 U.S. at 505, "there is no need to infer 
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the 
substantive provisions" of the legislation. California 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 
282 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.) . Such reasoning is 
a variant of the familiar principle of expression unius 
est exclusion alterius: Congress' enactment of a 
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute 
implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted. 
Cipollone v. Liggert Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). A more 
than "reasonable inference" can be drawn here that the Federal 
Boating Act's express language precludes a finding of implied 
While using their boats at GCNRA, Appellants are in no 
way connected to the Federal Government or to the federal 
operation of GCNRA. They are private citizens permissively using 
the area. 
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conflict preemption• The very system Appellants claim is preempted 
has been specifically approved of under federal law. See 46 U.S.C. 
§ 12307 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 174.31 (1995); 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995). 
In sum, the trial court's decision that there is no implied 
conflict preemption in this case is well supported by legal 
presumptions, case law, federal statutes and regulations, and an 
established rule of statutory construction, and should be affirmed. 
3. NO FIELD PREEMPTION EXISTS IN THIS CASE 
Field preemption has not occurred in the present case. It 
occurs only "when the scheme of federal regulation is *so pervasive 
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the States to supplement it (.)'" Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). With respect to Utah's 
regulation of recreational boating at GCNRA, the question is not 
one of "supplemental" authority, it is one of express federal 
recognition of the State's authority to register boats, levy taxes 
as part of the registration process, have the process (including 
taxation) apply within federal areas generally, and specifically 
within a National Park Service area such as GCNRA. 
In Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F.Supp 1579 (M.D. Ga. 
1991), which interpreted the Federal Boat Safety Act, and which 
Appellants rely upon heavily, the court concluded "that Congress 
did not intend to occupy the entire field of boat safety regulation 
. . . ." 776 F. Supp. at 1582. A fortiori Congress did not intend 
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to occupy the field of boat-use regulation generally. See Kaneohe 
Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 861 P.2d 1 (Hawaii 1993) . The 
Federal Boat Safety Act contains language allowing the States to 
impose registration conditions related to tax payment. 46 U.S.C. 
§ 12307 (1994). The Act's legislative history envisions a 
significant state role for enforcing safe boating laws and 
regulations "directed at safe operation and use." S. Rep. No. 248, 
92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1, 20 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1333, 1341. The Boat Safety Act and applicable federal regulation 
argue against field preemption, not for it, as Appellants contend. 
Appellants' Brief at 21, 22. 
Appellants' reliance on various memoranda of understanding 
between the State of Utah and the Federal Government is also 
misplaced. Appellants' Brief at 22-24. State and federal entities 
have signed several cooperative agreements pertaining to GCNRA. 
These are based upon the sovereignty of the governmental entities. 
Nothing in a state's inherent governmental authority prevents it 
from negotiating cooperative agreements with the Federal 
Government, and nothing about a state's sovereignty prevents state 
agencies from working closely with their federal counterparts in 
regulating recreational boating and other activities, as is the 
case at GCNRA. But, the notion that "any state action [at GCNRA] 
must depend upon cooperative independent agreements with 
[federal]...agencies," as Appellants contend, Appellants' Brief at 
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p. 24, is absurd. Indeed, Utah enters into cooperative agreements 
with the Federal Government because it has the sovereign authority, 
or jurisdiction, to do so, and not because it lacks authority to 
act without them. The cooperative agreements do not delegate 
authority to the State. 
Further, as a matter of law, federal regulation of the 
Colorado River generally, and GCNRA specifically, is irrelevant to 
field occupation preemption because the federal law and regulations 
Appellants refer to have nothing to do with recreational boating. 
Even if they did, the United States Supreme Court has said: 
To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a 
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying 
that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a 
field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, 
of course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state 
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 717 
(1985) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has 
also clarified, xx . . . it is appropriate to expect a . . . 
regulation to declare any intention to pre-empt state law with some 
specificity (,) . . . we will pause before saying that the mere 
volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicated that 
[it] did in fact intend to preempt." California Coastal Comm'n v. 
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (citation omitted). 
Appellants do not even begin to show how the "field" of vessel 
regulation at GCNRA is generally preempted by the federal laws 
dealing with water storage and regulation on the Colorado River. 
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It is critical to remember that United States Supreme Court 
cases narrowly define instances where field preemption is 
recognized. Despite an "extensive and comprehensive set of 
controls over ships and shipping" a local ordinance prohibiting 
pollution from ships was not preempted. Huron Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444-46 (1960). Despite the extensive 
federal role in nuclear power, not all state laws governing it are 
preempted. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983). Despite 
far-reaching and complex federal mining regulations, California's 
role in mining regulation on federal lands was upheld. California 
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 593-94. 
Moreover, the difference between these cases and the present 
action is that in none of the cases did federal law and regulations 
specifically recognize and approve the state role concerning which 
the preemption was claimed, as is the case here. Put another way, 
Appellants are hard-pressed to argue that federal law regulating 
recreational boating at GCNRA preempts state law generally when 
federal statutes and regulations expressly carve out for the State 
the specific role Appellants assert has been preempted. 
Appellants' effort to use Indian law to broaden the scope of 
their field preemption argument is misleading and ignores the 
narrow scope courts have recognized for such preemption. 
Appellants cite Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. United 
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States, 711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983), a treaty rights case, to 
support their preemption argument. Lower Brule Sioux Tribe was not 
a case where dam construction displaced state jurisdiction, but a 
case where dam construction did not abrogate treaty rights which 
would have given the State jurisdiction over the area. Similarly, 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), is inapplicable to 
a preemption doctrine claim such as Appellants make here because 
that case also involves Indian jurisdiction issues. Further, the 
tribe there was not deprived of all jurisdiction over hunting and 
fishing in the area, as Appellants assert, Appellants' Brief at 19, 
only the power to license non-Indian use of the land. Bourland, 
508 U.S. at 694-96. Use of Indian law cases, which involve tribal 
sovereignty and treaty rights, to bolster implied field preemption 
arguments is misguided.5 Regardless, there is no field preemption 
here. 
In sum, Appellants have not come within a country mile of 
rebutting the presumption against field preemption. In fact, 
federal law and the actions of federal agencies show that the State 
is free to regulate recreational boating activities within GCNRA. 
If such an approach were appropriate, the State suggests 
that Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942 (1994), and 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), are 
more closely related to issues at hand here, and would be more 
appropriately cited than the Indian law cases Appellants cite. 
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III. NO NATIONAL INTERESTS ADVANCED BY 
EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL REGULATION OF BOATING AT 
GCNRA WOULD JUSTIFY CURTAILING UTAH'S 
JURISDICTION WITHIN GCNRA 
No national interest advanced by federal management and 
control of GCNRA would justify curtailing Utah's general tax and 
police powers in this case. Cases relied upon to the contrary by 
Appellants, such as Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), are 
easily distinguished. In Hines, the federal law at issue related 
to foreign affairs, and any justification for a state role was 
understandably weak. 312 U.S. at 62-63. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, in discussing that weakness, said, "[a]ny 
concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the 
narrowest of limits; the statesfs power here is not bottomed on the 
same broad base as is its power to tax." Id. at 68. In the 
present case, the power to tax is the precise power at issue. 
Moreover, the Federal Boat Safety Act provides that regulation of 
boat operation, including boat registration, was left to the 
States. See 46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994). The legislative history of 
that provision makes clear that, "[t]he section does not preempt 
state law or regulation directed at safe boat operation and use, 
which was felt to be appropriately within the purview of state and 
local concerns." S. Rep. No. 248, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1, 20 
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N 1333, 1341. 
The Federal Government has no pretensions concerning its 
exclusive authority to regulate boating at GCNRA. The trial court 
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found "significant the absence of any federal participation" in the 
proceedings below. Addendum A at A-3. "The National Park Service 
and the Coast Guard are apparently not concerned that enforcement 
of Utah's registration laws would impair their effective regulation 
of boating activity within GCNRA," the court said. Id. With this 
in mind, this Court should not assume a conflict between national 
interests and operation of state jurisdiction when none exists. As 
United States Supreme Court Justice Kennedy noted: 
Our decisions establish that a high threshold must be met 
if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with 
the purposes of a federal act. Any conflict must be 
'irreconcilable . . . . The existence of a hypothetical 
or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-
emption of the state statute.' 
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Rice v. Norman 
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)). 
National interests are not advanced by exclusive federal 
regulation at GCNRA. The "uniform body of federal law" applicable 
here explicitly provides for state boat registration, see 46 U.S.C. 
§ 12307 (1994), recognizes the authority of states to levy taxes in 
federal areas, see 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), and applies state 
regulations within National Park Service areas like GCNRA, see 36 
C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995). Thus, it would not "unduly frustrate the 
purposes of [federal] statutes to permit concurrent state 
regulation," as Appellants assert. Appellants' Brief at 25. In 
fact, just the opposite is true. It would be contrary to national 
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interests for Utah's jurisdiction to regulate boating activities 
within GCNRA to abruptly disappear. 
IV. UTAH'S BOAT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ARE 
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Left without any plausible argument concerning Utah's 
jurisdiction to enforce its boating laws at GCNRA, Appellants' only 
hope for success is to argue that Utah boating law violates the 
Federal Commerce Clause. But Utah's boat registration requirement 
for all boats operated in the State, including those within GCNRA, 
and the related property tax requirement, is permissible under 
appropriate constitutional analysis. 
The Commerce Clause provides: 
"Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate commerce 
. . . among the several states." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to 
Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a 
"negative" aspect that denies the States the power 
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the 
interstate flow of articles of commerce. 
Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.Ct. 
1345, 1349 (1994) (citations omitted). Appellants concede that the 
property tax in question here is applied equally to all boats in 
Utah. Appellants' Brief at 29. Thus, there is no discrimination 
against out-of-state residents, and Appellants must show that the 
tax impermissibly burdens the flow of interstate commerce. 
In this regard, Appellants fail to meet even threshold 
requirements. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), 
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recognized earlier precedents that when a commodity "comes to rest" 
it may be taxed without violating the Commerce Clause. See 397 
U.S. at 141. The United States Supreme Court made the point more 
clearly in Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). It upheld a 
ban on billboards advertising tobacco products, saying: 
[T]he prohibition is non-discriminatory, applying 
regardless of the origin of the poster. Its operation is 
wholly intrastate, beginning after the interstate 
movement of the poster has ceased. Compare Hygrade 
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 503; Hebe Co. v. 
Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 304. See also Corn Products Refining 
Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 433. To sustain the 
defendant's contention would be to hold that the posters, 
because of their origin, were entitled to permanent 
immunity from the exercise of state regulatory power. 
The Federal Constitution does not so require. 
Packer Corp., 285 U.S. at 110-11. 
Similarly, the houseboats in question here are no longer "in" 
interstate commerce. They have been permanently located at Lake 
Powell since the 1980fs, Appellants' Brief at 8, and have "come to 
rest." A holding that property located in Utah for over ten years 
cannot be taxed because such a tax would impede the flow of 
interstate commerce and would call into question taxation of any 
personal property in the State. 
1. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UTAH'S BOAT REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS AND THOSE OF SURROUNDING STATES DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Utah's imposition of different boat registration conditions 
than its sister States does not violate the Commerce Clause. The 
assertion fails to meet the initial Commerce Clause requirement of 
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demonstrating a burden on interstate commerce. Pike, 397 U.S. at 
140. Under Pike, "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.'' 397 U.S. at 142 (quoting 
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (I960)). 
For example, Hawaii's rules regulating anchorage and mooring 
privilege within its ocean waters and navigable streams that had 
some effect on interstate commerce withstood Commerce Clause 
scrutiny because "the only effects of the...regulations on 
interstate commerce [we]re indirect." Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 
1185, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994) . Port and harbor fees imposed by a 
Louisiana port district that, arguably, impacted interstate 
commerce survived a "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause 
challenge because the fees did not impose "^substantial' burdens on 
interstate . . . commerce." New Orleans S.S. v. Plaquemines Portf 
Harbor and Terminal, 874 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1989). The 
difference between these two situations and the one presented by 
the instant case is that there is no burden on the flow of 
interstate commerce here, because the boats being taxed are no 
longer in interstate commerce. 
On the other hand, the State benefits from registering all 
boats within its territorial borders. The law underlies receipt of 
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state and federal funds to the State's boating program that, by 
law, are distributed based on the number of boats registered in the 
State.6 Also, the law facilitates tax collection. The Federal 
Boat Safety Act demonstrates Congress considered this a legitimate 
goal of state registration laws because the States were allowed to 
condition boat registration on tax collection. See 46 U.S.C. § 
12307 (1994). Thus, Congress has approved of the very provision of 
state regulation that Appellants assert impermissibly burdens 
interstate commerce, and with such congressional approval any 
Commerce Clause argument is very difficult for Appellants to 
sustain. 
The Tenth Circuit held "that 'the person challenging a statute 
that regulates even-handedly bears the burden of showing that the 
incidental burden on interstate commerce is excessive compared to 
the local interest.1" Blue Circle Cement v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1511 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Dorrance v. 
McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1992)). Appellants' 
Appellees direct this Court's attention to 46 U.S.C. § 
13103 (1994), which explains the federal formula for allocating 
and distributing federal recreational boating safety funds. Utah 
has approved systems for vessel numbering and marine casualty 
reporting, see 33 C.F.R. § 173 Appendix A (1995). Thus, two-
thirds of the federal recreational boat safety funds Utah 
receives depend upon the number of boats registered in Utah. 
Likewise, under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-201(6) (1996), the 
Utah Tax Commission transfers an amount to the Boating Restricted 
Account, which helps fund the State's boating program, based on a 
formula that depends on the number of registered boats in Utah. 
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challenge fails because, among other reasons, their brief is devoid 
of any weighing of the alleged burden imposed on the flow of 
interstate commerce versus the benefits to the State resulting from 
the State's registration of boats at GCNRA. 
Appellants also fail to show how Bib v. Navajo Freight Lines, 
359 U.S. 520 (1959), applies here. There, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that compliance with one state's statute would 
violate another state's statute. No such situation exists in this 
case, and could not exist because of the federal requirement that 
a boat acquire its registration number in the state where it is 
principally used. 33 C.F.R. § 173.21 (1995). Appellants can 
conform to Utah's registration law without violating any other 
States' statutes or any federal law. Moreover, in Bib v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, the Court found very little benefit to the state and 
a substantial interstate commerce burden. 359 U.S. at 525-27. 
Any evaluation of the respective burdens in this case, if 
Appellants chose to conduct one, would result in a conclusion on 
Commerce Clause review opposite to the one Appellants erroneously 
espouse. The State receives a substantial benefit from the 
facilitation of the collection of taxes and the receipt of state 
and federal boat program funds, while there is no burden on 
interstate commerce. Appellants fail to understand that the burden 
weighed to substantiate a Commerce Clause challenge is not the 
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burden on them as individuals, but the burden on the flow of 
interstate commerce itself. 
2. COLLECTION OF PROPERTY TAX ON BOATS OPERATED WITHIN GCNRA 
IS ALLOWED BY THE COMMERCE CLAUSE EVEN IF IT WOULD BURDEN 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
In Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 
S.Ct. 1345 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stressed that it 
is a "settled principle that interstate commerce may be made to 
p^ay its way.'" Id. at 1351 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977)). Moreover, in taxing 
interstate commerce there is no requirement that the persons being 
taxed receive benefits equivalent to the tax. See Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 n.16 (1981). In 
Commonwealth Edison, the Court upheld a tax although the appellants 
alleged that they received two cents in services for every two 
dollars paid in taxes. 453 U.S. at 620 n.10. The Court rejected 
appellants' claim that Complete Auto Transit required the benefit 
to be approximately the same as the amount paid in taxes. Id. at 
621. 
Here, the trial court correctly rejected a requirement that 
there be a quid pro quo between tax revenues and expenditures. 
Addendum A at A-3. The boats in question enjoy police protection 
and other similar services provided by state and local governments, 
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which is all the Commerce Clause demands for a tax to be allowed.7 
See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 627. Moreover, Utah law has 
provided for many years that it is permissible to tax property 
involved in interstate commerce. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. 
Lynch, 55 P. 639, 641 (Utah 1898) (citing Pulman's Palace-Car Co. 
v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18) . Thus, nothing in either the Utah or 
United States Constitutions prohibits the tax here. 
Additionally, in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 55 
P. 639 (Utah 1898), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "in order that 
property may be subjected to taxation, it is not a requisite that 
the owner should reside in the state; and this is true as to 
personal property, tangible or intangible, as well as real." Id. 
at 640. Thus, Appellants' status as non-Utah residents having 
property taxed by the State does not raise Utah constitutional 
issues. Their residency is also unimportant under the Federal 
Constitution. See Connecticut Limousine Service, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
248 A.2d 578, 579 (Conn. 1966) (citing Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. 
Twombly, C.C., 29 F. 658). 
Furthermore, the rule adopted in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), validates the property tax 
There are numerous other state and locally provided 
services which Appellants and other members of the public enjoy 
at GCNRA, such as law enforcement, search and rescue protection, 
highway maintenance, gas pump calibration, inspection of food 
service establishments, and ferry operation, just to name a few. 
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implicated in this case under Commerce Clause analysis. Appellants 
correctly point out that the Commerce Clause imposes a substantial 
nexus requirement on a state's ability to tax an out-of-state 
entity. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992). 
Appellants' Brief at 34. This requirement is satisfied here by the 
taxpayers' activities and the physical presence of their boats in 
Utah. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-315. 
Also, the trial court correctly concluded: 
Property taxes are collected to support the general 
function of government, not the enforcement of particular 
laws. The State of Utah has an obligation to provide 
general government services, such as law enforcement, 
social services, and education, within GCNRA. It is not 
required to demonstrate a direct quid pro quo 
relationship between revenues and expenditures. The 
Commerce Clause claim must therefore fail as well. 
Addendum A at A-3 (emphasis in original). In Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), the United States Supreme 
Court said, in upholding the collection of state taxes on an Indian 
reservation, an area where the State asserts there are more 
questions about the exercise of its jurisdiction than there are 
within GCNRA, "there is no constitutional requirement that the 
benefits received from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial 
taxpayer—or by those living in the community where the taxpayer is 
located—must equal the amount of its tax obligations." Id. at 
180. 
In sum, the tax involved in this case does not implicate 
interstate commerce because the boats being taxed have "come to 
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rest." They are no longer "in" commerce. In the alternative, the 
"burden" placed on the flow of interstate commerce by Utah's 
registration of boats at GCNRA, if any, is de minimus and, in any 
case, does not outweigh the known benefits to the State that arise 
from the process. Moreover, there is no problem with the tax under 
the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah has jurisdiction to enforce its laws within GCNRA. It 
acquired that jurisdiction when it became a State in 1896, and has 
not ceded any portion of that jurisdiction to the Federal 
Government. Utah's boating registration law has not been 
preempted. Neither expressed, field, nor conflict preemption can 
be shown here. Since those are the only methods recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court for federal law to preempt state law, 
no preemption could have possibly occurred in this case. 
Appellants' contention that the Commerce Clause prohibits 
Utah's boat registration laws has even less merit. First, 
Appellants have failed to show how the Commerce Clause has been 
implicated here in the first instance. For the Commerce Clause to 
be applicable, the State's law must be discriminatory or must 
burden the flow of interstate commerce. Implementation of Utah's 
boat registration laws at GCNRA does neither. 
Moreover, the property tax on the houseboats, which has always 
been the true target of this suit, is valid. The tax is applied to 
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an activity with a substantial nexus to the State, is fairly 
apportioned, and does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 
Therefore, the State requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's holding that Utah has jurisdiction to enforce its laws, 
particularly the Utah Boating Act, within GCNRA and to affirm the 
convictions below. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM, No. 1231 
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ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH 
1594 West North Temple, #300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
Telephone: (801) 538-7227 
CRAIG C. HALLS 
San Juan County Attorney 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of October, 1996, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, and the 
accompanying Addendum, were served by mailing the same, first-class 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
R. Dennis I ekes 
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
297 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 850 
MONTICELLO UT 84535 
Jay R, Adkins, Assistant Attorney General 
ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
1275 West Washington 
PHOENIX AZ 85007 
/{tw^—-
Noritap7 K/ johnson 
Assiptajir Attorney General 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONRAD STERKEL, MEL G. CAHO, 
WILLIAM A- PICKETT, ALAN L. 
HERMAN, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No, 9417-156, 9417-
172, 9417-197, and 9417-200 
Defendants in these cases have moved to dismiss the charges 
filed against them for failing to register their boats. Each has 
demonstrated, and the state concedes, that the boats were 
maintained and operated within the confines of the Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area ("GCNRA"), 
The court has reviewed all of the memoranda filed by counsel. 
After initially requesting oral argument, counsel for the 
defendants notified the court on January 29, 1996, that oral 
argument was waived. 
Defendants maintain that the land within GCNRA is exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the United States and that the laws of 
the State of Utah are without any force there. Alternatively, if 
there is some state jurisdiction within GCNRA it cannot extend to 
requiring defendants to register and pay taxes on their boats 
located there. 
A-l 
Defendants have failed to persuade the court that Congress 
intended to divest the State of Utah generally of its power to 
enforce state laws within GCNRA. They have not identified any 
express legislative language effecting a divestiture. Absent any 
express statement, the court has no need to determine if Congress 
has the power to divest Utah of jurisdiction. Utah has 
jurisdiction to enforce its laws except as preempted by Congress 
exercising its powers under the Property Clause. 
The state concedes that, even though federal jurisdiction over 
GCNRA is not exclusive, Congress has the power under the Property 
Clause to preempt state laws that interfere with federal regulation 
of federal property. The state also concedes that such preemption 
need not be explicit, if interference with federal goals is 
evident. Since defendants have not identified any explicit 
congressional preemption of the state 's boating registration laws, 
their preemption claim must rest on actual interference. 
Defendants have demonstrated that federal regulation of 
boating activity within GCNRA is extensive, even pervasive. They 
have not, however, identified any conflict between federal laws and 
regulations and the state laws in question here. The question, as 
this court understands it, is whether compliance with the 
questioned state law would prevent or impede compliance with 
federal laws or regulations. Defendants have not identified any 
such interference. They suggest that enforcement of the 
registration — and related taxation — requirements of Utah law 
may discourage them from leaving their boats at GCNRA, discourage 
A- 2 
boating within GCNRA, or encourage some owners to change the place 
of mooring. Those effects are speculative, remote and 
insubstantial. The court declines to rest a finding of preemption 
on so weak a reed. 
In considering the preemption claim, the court finds 
significant the absence of any federal participation in these 
actions. The National Park Service and the Coast Guard are 
apparently not concerned that enforcement of Utah/s registration 
laws would impair their effective regulation of boating activity 
within GCNRA. 
Finally, the court addresses the related Commerce Clause 
argument of defendants. While related to the preemption claim, it 
is separate and based upon the theory that state taxation has 
limits. Defendants claim that the taxes that they must pay in 
order to register their boats are not fairly related to services 
provided within GCNRA. 
Defendants mistake the purpose of property taxes. Property 
taxes are collected to support the general function of government, 
not the enforcement of particular laws. The State of Utah has an 
obligation to provide general government services, such as law 
enforcement, social services, and education, within GCNRA. It is 
not required to demonstrate a direct quid pro quo relationship 
between revenues and expenditures. The Commerce Clause claim must 
therefore fail as well. 
A-3 
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The parties are 
directed to appear before the court on February 29, 1996, at 9:30 
a.m. to set their trial dates and address any additional pre-trial 
issues. 
DATED the lito f January, 1996, 
/ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage 
prepaid, this J^L_ d aY o f 4 J ^ W ^ 1996, to the following: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Mr. R. Dennis Ickes 
Attorney for Defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
& us i (I 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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(,j) three membcro to be appointed by the Sodratary to rcprcjont 
^>the general public. 
(c) jE^e Secretary shall designate one member to be Chairman. Any 
acancy i r ^ e Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which 
le original appointment was made. 
l(d) A memberbf^he Commission shall serve without compensation 
s such. The SecretarKjs authorized to pay the expenses reasonably 
lcurred by the Commission in carrying out its responsibility under 
his Act upon vouchers signecrbs^the Chairman. 
•(e) The Commission e s t ab l i shed^ this section shall act and advise 
y affirmative vote of a majority of tnts^nembers thereof. 
(f) The Secretary or his designee shafis^rom time to time, consult 
rith the members of the Commission with respect to matters relating 
3 the development of the recreation area. ^ s . 
SEC. 5. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums 
s may be necessary to carry out the provisions of thisS^ct, but not 
lore than $12,125,000 for the acquisition of lands and im^ests in 
inds and not more than $92,813,000 (July, 1971 prices) for de>fel<x>-
lent of the recreation area, plus or minus such amounts, if any, a^s 
lay be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuations in the construction 
osts as indicated oy engineering cost indices applicable to the type of 
anstruction involved herein. 
Appiinud Oitobci' 57, 1Q7S. 
Chairman 
E x p e n s e s . 
Appropriation. 
Public Law 92-593 
A N A C T October 27, 1972 
To establish the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in the States of Arizona £s- 27) 
and Utah. 
* Be it enacted by the Senate and Home of Representative* of the 
United States of America in Congress axxembled, That in order to den canyon 
provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of Lake non^ea*^*3.* 
Powell and lands adjacent thereto in the States of Arizona and Utah Utah.re 
Uid to preserve scenic, scientific, and historic features contributing Establishment. 
to public enjoyment of the area, there is established the Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area (hereafter referred to as the ''recreation 
area") to comprise the area generally depicted on the drawing entitled 
^Boundary Map Glen Canyon Xational Recreation Area/ ' numbered 
GLC-91,006 and dated August 1972, which is on file and available 
for public inspection in the office of the National Park Service, Depart-
ment of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior (hereafter referred 
to as the "Secretary") may revise the boundaries of the recreation area 
from time to time by publication in thp Federal Register of a revised 
drawing or other boundary description, but the total acreage of the 
National recreation area may not exxccd one million two hundred and 
thirty-six thousand eight hundred and eighty acres. 
SEC. 2. (a) Within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Secre-
tary may acquire lands and interests in lands by donation, purchase1, or 
exchange. Any lands owned by the States of Utah or Arizona, or any 
State, political subdivisions thereof, may be acquired only by donation 
o r
 exchange. No lands held in trust for any Indian tribe may be 
Acquired except with the concurrence of the tribal council. 
„-(b) Nothing in this Act shall IK? construed to affect the mineral 
Sights reserved to the Navajo Indian Tribe under section 2 of the Act 
Of September 2, 1958 (72 Stat. l(>8tt). or the rights reserved to the 
Aavajo Indian Tribal Council in said section 2 with respect to the use 
°f the lands there described under the heading "PARCEL IV. 
,^ Publ icat ion in 
Federa l Regis-
ter . 
Land acqu i s i -
t ion. 
Limitat ion. 
B - l 
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Public lands, 
withdrawal. 
64 Stat. 463. 
41 Stat. 437; 
74 Stat. 790. 




70 Stat. 105. 








SEC. 3. (a) The lands within the recreation area, subject to valid 
existing rights, are withdrawn from location, entry, and patent Hinder^ 
the United States mining laws. Under such regulations as he deems' 
appropriate, the Secretary shall permit the removal of the nonleasabfe 
minerals from lands or interests in lands within the national recreation^ 
area in the manner prescribed bv section 10 of the Act of August 4, 
1939, as amended (:>3 Stat. 1196; 43 U.S.C 387 et seq.), and he shall 
permit the removal of leasable minerals from lands or interests in 
lands within the recreation area in accordance with the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) or 
the Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing Act of August 7,1947 (30 U.S.C. 
351 et seq.). if he finds that such disposition would not have significant 
adverse effects on the Glen Canyon project or on the administration 
of the national recreation area pursuant to this Act. 
(b) All receipts derived from permits and leases issued on landsaij 
the recreation area under the Mineral Leasing Act of February i}§| 
1920, as amended, or the Act of August 7, 1947, shall be disposed $ 1 
as provided in the applicable Act; and receipts from the dispositic^ 
of nonleasable minerals within the recreation area shall be disposedi' 
of in the same manner as moneys received from the sale of public lands*' 
SEC. 4. The Secretary shall administer, protect, and develop t h e . n ^ 
reation area in accordance with the provisions of the Act of A u g u s t ^ 
1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S .C 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented^ 
and with any other statutory authority available to him for the con^ 
servation and management of natural resources to the extent he finds 
such authority will further the purposes of this Act : Provided, hopj~A 
ever, That nothing in this Act shall affect or interfere with th$ 
authority of the Secretary granted by Public Law 485, E i g h t y - f o ^ ^ 
Congress, second session, to operate Glen Canyon Dam and ReserV^i 
in accordance with the purposes of the Colorado River Storage P r o j ^ 
Act for river regulation, irrigation, flood control, and generat ion"^ 
hydroelectric power. 
SEC. 5. The Secretary shall permit hunting, fishing, and t r a p p i n g ^ 
lands and waters under his jurisdiction within the boundaries of ^ ^ 
recreation area in accordance with applicable laws of the United S t a p i 
and the States of Utah and Arizona, except that the Secretary m&y 
designate zones where, and establish periods when, no hunting, fishing; 
or trapping shall be permitted for reasons of public safety, administrate 
tion, or public use and enjoyment. Except in emergencies, any regiJBS 
tion of the Secretary pursuant to this section shall be put into effect 
only after consultation with the appropriate State fish and g a m | 
department. 
S E C 6. The administration of mineral and grazing leases within t f i | 
recreation area shall be by the Bureau of Land Management. The same 
policies followed by the Bureau of Land Management in issuing and 
administering mineral and grazing leases on other lands under its 
jurisdiction shall be followed in regard to the lands within the 
boundaries of the recreation area, subject to the provisions of sections 
3(a) and 4 of this Act. 
SEC. 7. The Secretary shall grant easements and rights-of-way on a 
nondiscriminatory basis upon, over, under, across, or along any com-
ponent of the recreation area unless he finds that the route of such 
easements and rights-of-way would have significant adverse effects 
on the administration of the recreation area. 
SEC. 8. (a) The Secretary together with the Highway Department 
of the State of Utah, shall conduct a study of proposed road aline-
ments within and adjacent to the recreation area. Such study shall 
locate the specific route of a scenic, low-speed road, hereby authorized, 
from Glen Canyon City to Bullfrog Basin, crossing the Escalante 
B - 2 
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River south of the point where the river has entered Lake Powell 
when the lake is at the three thousand seven hundred-foot level. In 
determining the route for this road, special care shall be taken to 
minimize any adverse environmental impact and said road is not 
required to meet ordinary secondary road standards as to grade, 
alinement, and curvature. Turnouts, overlooks, and scenic vistas may 
be included in the road plan. In no event shall said route cross the 
Escalante River north of Stephens Arch. 
(b) The studv shall include a reasonable timetable for the engineer-
ing, planning, and construction of the road authorized in section 8(a) 
and the Secretary of the Interior shall adhere to said timetable in every 
wav feasible to him. 
(c) The Secretary is authorized to construct and maintain markers 
and other interpretive devices consistent with highway safety 
standards. 
(d) The study specified in section 8(a) heitsof shall designate what 
additional roads are appropriate and necessary for full utilization of 
the area for the purposes of this Act and to connect with all roads of 
ingress to, and egress from the recreation area. 
(e) The findings and conclusions of the Secretary and the Highway 
Department of the State of Utah, specified in section 8(a) , shall be 
submitted to Congress within two years of the date of enactment of 
this Act, and shall include recommendations for any further legisla-
tion necessary to implement the findings and conclusions. I t shall 
specify the funds necessary for appropriation in order to meet the 
timetable fixed in section 8(b) . 
SEC. 9. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary shall report to the President, in accordance with sub-
sections 3(c) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act (78 S t a t 890j 16 U.S.C. 
1132 (c) and (d ) ) , his recommendations as to the suitability or non-
suitability of any area within the recreation area for preservation 
as wilderness, and any designation of any such area as wilderness 
shall be in accordance with said Wilderness Act. 
SEC. 10. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums 
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, not to 
exceed, however, $400,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests 
in lands and not to exceed $37,325,400 for development The sums 
authorized in this section shall be available for acquisition and devel-
opment undertaken subsequent to the approval of this A c t 






Report to Pre si* 
dent. 
16 USC 1131 
note. 
Appropriation. 
jblio Law 92-594 
To 
AN ACT 
section 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 29<j7. 
October 27. 1972 
fS. 354S] 
Be it enacted by tlie^S^nate and House of Representatives of tlie 
United States of Arrierkaw^^tgress assembled, That subsection (e) F i s h e r m e n ' s 
tive 
* ' ^^*. /-.-. TT r>i m ~CK*-L Protective Act of 
A c t Of 1 9 6 7 ( 2 2 U . S . C . 1 9 7 7 1967, amendments 
82 Stat. 729. 
Jective until Ju ly 1, 
of section 7 of the Fishermen's 
( e ) ) , is amended to read as follows: 
"(e) The provisions of this section shall 
1977.". ^ 
SEC. 2. Clause (1) of subsection (f) of section 7 of thel^ishermen's 
Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C. 1977(f) (1 ) ) , is amended toftwu! as 
follows: 
"(1) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce/'. 
—Apfjiun'J Gh tuber S7, 107:3. 
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T • ARTICLE XII 
^Nothing in this Compact shall be construed to prevent the 
United States, a signatory State or political subdivision 
thereof, person, corporation, or association, from instituting or 
maintaining any action or proceeding, legal or equitable, for 
the protection of any right under State or Federal law or under 
this Compact. 
\ ARTICLE XIII 
NothinV contained in this Compact shall be deemed 
1. T&> affect the obligations of the United States of 
America to the Indian tribes; 
2. IbXimpair, extend or otherwise affect any right or 
power ofyhe United States, its agencies or instrumentali-
ties involVed herein; nor the capacity of the United States 
to hold orVcquire additional rights to the use of the water 
of the BeaA River; 
3. lb suraect any property or rights of the United 
States to the\ laws of the States which were not subject 
thereto prior V) the date of this Compact; 
4. lb subject any property of the United States to 
taxation by theVStates or any subdivision thereof, nor to 
obligate the Uniwjd States to pay any State or subdivision 
thereof for loss ofc taxes. 
VRTICLE xrv 
At intervals not exceeding twenty years, the Commission 
shall review the provisions hereof, and after notice and public 
hearing, may propose amendments to any such provision, 
provided, however, that the\ provisions contained herein shall 
remain in full force and effect until such proposed amend-
ments have been ratified by Vhe legislatures of the signatory 
States and consented to by Congress. 
ARTICLE XV 
This Compact may be terminated at any time by the 
unanimous agreement of the signVtory States. In the event of 
such termination all rights established under it shall continue 
unimpaired. \ 
ARTICLE XW 
Should a court of competent jurisdiction hold any part of 
this Compact to be contrary to the constitution of any signa-
tory State or to the Constitution of the United States, all other 
severable provisions of this Compact sftall continue in full 
force and effect. \ 
ARTICLE XVII \ 
This Compact shall be in effect when itVhall have been 
ratified by the Legislature of each signatoryyState and con-
sented to by the Congress of the United Stares of America. 
Notice of ratification by the legislatures of Yhe signatory 
States shall be given by the Governor of each signatory State 
to the Governor of each of the other signatory States and to the 
President of the United States of America, and th\ President 
is hereby requested to give notice to the GovernorW each of 
the signatory States of approval by the Congress of the United 
States of America. \ 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The Commissioners and their 
advisers have executed this Compact in five originalsXone of 
which shall be deposited with the General Services Adminis-
tration of the United States of America, one of which shall be 
forwarded to the Governor of each of the signatory States,Void 
one of which shall be made a part of the permanent record^ of 
the Bear River Commission. \ 
Done at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 22nd day of DecembeV, 
1070. •' • • • , , • • • „ • > 
E UI Lhb SUXUJ uf Idaliu. 
(» Clifford J. Skinner 
(s\ J. Daniel Roberts 
For\the State of Utah: 
(s) SL Paul Homgren 
(s) S\neon Weston 
(s) Don W. Gilbert 
(s) Daniel F. Lawrence 
For thaState of Wyoming: 
(s) Geonge L. Christopulos (s) John A. Tsichert 
(s) J. W.^yers 
Approved:) 
Wallace N. Vibson 
Representative of the 
United Statea of America 
Attest: 
Daniel F. Lawrence 
Secretary of the Bear 
River Commission 1975 
73-16-3. Ratification of compact. 
The compact ratified by this act is the original signed by the 
commissioners representing the states of Idaho, Utah, and 
Wyoming, and theUecretary of the commission, and approved 
by the representative of the United States of America, and 
deposited in the archives of the Department of State of the 
United States of America and with the Division of Archives oi 
the state of Utah. \ 19& 
73-16-4. Members o\ commission. 
There shall be three \pembers of the Bear River Compact 
commission from the state of Utah. One member shall be the 
interstate stream commissioner of Utah and he shall be 
chairman of the Utah delegation. The other two commission 
ers from Utah shall be appomted by the state water and powe] 
board with the consent of tft£ governor, and they shall hole 
office at the pleasure of the water and power board and unti 
their successors shall have bee\ appointed and qualified. Eacl 
member shall be a bona fide resident of the state of Utah an< 
one shall be a landowner and thaupper division as defined b] 
the compact. The Utah water anc\ power board may with th< 
consent of the governor appoint tw\) alternate members of th< 
Bear River commission. One such Alternate shall be a bom 
fide resident of the state of Utan\ and a landowner an< 
irrigator actually residing on and operating a farm within th< 
lower division as defined by the compact and he shall tx 
entitled to act at all regular and special meetings of the Bea 
River commission whenever the regulanmember of the com 
mission from this same area is unable iX serve and act. On< 
such alternate shall be a bena fide residentof the state of Utal 
and shall be a landowner and irrigator actually residing oi 
and operating a farm within the upper division as defined b; 
the compact and he shall be entitled to act a\ all regular an< 
special meetings of the Bear River commissions whenever thi 
regular member of the commission from thisXsame area i 
unable to serve and act. Each member of the commission fron 
Utah shall receive a per diem plus necessary wepenses, a 
provided by law. \ 198 
73-16-5. Error in copying does not invalidate^ 
Any error made, if any, in copying the original compact i 
Section 73-16-2 hereof, shall be held not to invalidate th 
ratification of the compact in any way. \ 195 
CHAPTER 17 \ 
COLUMBIA RIVER COMPACT \ 
(Superseded by Laws 1961, ch. 171, §§ 1 to 6.) ^ 
70 17 1 fee 70 17-4. Superseded. lOOi 
CHAPTER 18 




Statement of policy. 
Definitions. 
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Section 
73-18-3. Enforcement of State Boating Act to be super-
vised by division. 
73-18-3.5. Advisory council. 
73-18-4. Board may promulgate rules. 
73-18-5. Repealed. 
73-18-6. Numbering of motorboats and sailboats re-
quired — Exception. 
73-18-7. Registration requirements — Exemptions — 
Agents — Records — Period of registration 
and renewal — Expiration — Notice of 
transfer of interest or change of address — 
Duplicate registration card — Invalid regis-
tration — Powers of board. 
73-18-7.1. Fraudulent application for registration or cer-
tificate of title. 
73-18-7.2. Falsified registration or certificate of title. 
73-18-7.3. Suspension or revocation of a registration or 
certificate of title. 
73-18-7.4. Canceled, suspended, or revoked registration 
or certificate of title to be returned. 
73-18-8. Safety equipment required to be on board 
vessels. 
73-18-8.1. Capacity and certification label. 
73-18-9. Exemptions from registration. 
73-18-10. Owner of boat livery — Duties. 
73-18-11. Regulation of muffling devices. 
73-18-12. Operation in willful or wanton disregard for 
safety deemed misdemeanor. 
73-18-12.1. Operating under influence — Local ordinances 
to be consistent with chapter. 
73-18-12.2. Boating under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
or with high blood or breath alcohol content 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without a 
warrant. 
73-18-12.3. Operating under the influence — Standards 
for administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis. 
73-18-12.4. Operating under the influence — Admissibility 
of chemical test — Other evidence. 
73-18-12.5. Operating under the influence — Prosecuting 
violations of local ordinances. 
73-18-12.6. Operating under the influence — Implied con-
sent to chemical tests for alcohol or drugs — 
Refusal to submit — Revocation of registra-
tion — Court action on revocation — Person 
incapable of refusal — Results of test avail-
able — Who may give test — Evidence. 
73-18-12.7. Operating under the influence — Seizure and 
impoundment of vessel. 
73-18-12.8. Operating under the influence — Removal or 
impoundment of vehicle used to tow im-
pounded vessel. 
73-18-13. Duties of operator involved in accident — No-
tification and reporting procedures — Use of 
accident reports — Giving false information 
as misdemeanor. 
73-18-14. Transmittal of information to official or agency 
of United States. 
73-18-15. Board to adopt rules concerning water skiing 
and aquaplane riding and use of other de-
vices towed behind a vessel. 
73-18-15.1. Promulgation of vessel navigation and steering 
rules. 
73-18-15.2. Minimum age of operators without supervision 
— Exception — Fee for safety course. 
73-18-16. Regattas, races, exhibitions — Rules. 
73-18-17. Scope of application of chapter — Identical 
Section 
local ordinances authorized — Application 
for special local rules. 
73-18-18. Liability of owner for injury or damage occa-
sioned by negligent operation of vessel by 
minor. 
73-18-19. Publication of rules and regulations. 
73-18-20 Enforcement of chapter — Authority to stop 
and board vessels — Disregarding law en-
forcement signal to stop as misdemeanor — 
Procedure for arrest. 
73-18-20.1. Seizure of a vessel. 
73-18-20.2. Release and sale of a seized vessel. 
73-18-20.3. Falsified hull identification, engine, or motor 
number. 
73-18-20.4. Duty to report falsified vessel or motor num-
ber. 
73-18-20.5. Reporting of theft and recovery of vessels. 
73-18-20.6. Report by owners or lienholders of thefts and 
recoveries. 
73-18-20.7. Unlawful control over vessels — Penalties — 
Effect of prior consent —Accessory or accom-
plice. 
73-18-21. Violation of chapter as class B misdemeanor. 
73-18-22. Funds collected — Disposition. 
73-18-23. Separability clause. 
73-18-1. Statement of policy. 
It is the policy of this state to regulate and promote safety 
for persons and property in and connected with the use, 
operation and equipment of vessels and to promote uniformity 
of laws and to adopt and pursue an educational program in 
relation thereto. m i 
73-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board* means the Board of Parks and Recreation. 
(2) "Boat livery" means an entity which holds any 
vessel for renting, leasing, or chartering. 
(3) "Carrying passengers for hire" means to transport 
persons on vessels or to lead persons on vessels for 
remuneration. 
(4) "Dealer" means any person who is licensed by the 
appropriate authority to engage in and who is engaged in 
the business of buying and selling vessels or of manufac-
turing them for sale. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Parks and Recre-
ation. 
(6) "Motorboat" means any vessel propelled by machin-
ery* whether or not the machinery is the principal source 
of propulsion. 
(7) "Operate" means to navigate, control, or otherwise 
use a vessel. 
(8) "Operator" means the person who is in control of a 
vessel while it is in use. 
(9) "Owner" means a person, other than a lien holder, 
holding a proprietary interest in or the title to a vessel. 
The term includes a person entitled to the use or posses-
sion of a vessel subject to an interest by another person, 
reserved or created by agreement and securing payment 
or performance of an obligation. The term does not include 
a lessee under a lease not intended as security. 
(10) "Personal watercraft" means a motorboat that is: 
(a) less than 16 feet in length; 
(b) propelled by a water jet pump; and 
(c) designed to be operated by a person sitting, 
standing, or kneeling on the vessel, rather than 
sitting or standing inside the vessel. 
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vll) "Sailboat*" means any vessel having one or more 
sails and propelled by wind 
(12) "Vessel" means every type of watercraft, other 
than a seaplane on the water, used or capable of being 
used as a means of transportation on water 
(13) "Wakeless speed" means an operating speed a t 
which the vessel does not create or make a wake or white 
water trailing the vessel This speed is not m excess of five 
miles per hour 
Q4) "Waters of this state" means any waters within the 
territorial limits of this state 1995 
73-18-3. Enforcement of State Boating Act to be super-
vised by division. 
The administration and enforcement of the State Boating 
Act shall be under the supeT-vision and direction of the 
division 1986 
73-18-3.5. Adv i so ry counc i l . 
The board may appoint an advisory council representing 
various boating interests to seek recommendations on state 
boating policies 1987 
73-18-4. Board may promulgate rules. 
The board may promulgate rules 
(1) creating a uniform waterway marking system 
which shall be obeyed by all vessel operators, 
(2) regulating the placement of waterway markers and 
other permanent or anchored objects on the waters of this 
state, 
(3) zoning certain waters of this state for the purpose of 
prohibiting the operation of vessels or motors for safety 
and health purposes only, and 
(4) regulating vessel operators who carry passengers 
for hire ana setting a fee not to exceed $10 for licensing 
these operators 1987 
73-18-5. Repealed. 1969 
73-18-6. Number ing of motorboats and sai lboats re-
quired — Exception. 
(1) Every motorboat and sailboat on the waters of this state 
shall be numbered No person shall operate or give permission 
for the operation of any motorboat or sailboat on the waters of 
this state unless the motorboat or sailboat is numbered m 
accordance with 
(a) this chapter, 
(b) applicable federal law, or 
(c) a federally-approved numbering system of another 
state, if the owner is a resident of that state and his 
motorboat or sailboat has not been in this state in excess 
of 60 days for the calendar year 
(2) The number assigned to a motorboat or sailboat in 
accordance with this chapter, applicable federal law, or a 
federally-approved numbering system of another state shall 
be displayed on each side of the bow of the motorboat or 
sailboat, except this requirement does not apply to any vessel 
which has a valid marine document issued by the United 
States Coast Guard 1987 
73-18-7. Registrat ion requirements — Exempt ions — 
Agents — Records — Per iod of registrat ion 
and renewal — Expirat ion — Not ice of trans-
fer of interest or change of address — Dupli-
cate registrat ion card — Inval id registrat ion 
— P o w e r s of board. 
(1) (a) Each motorboat and sailboat on the waters of this 
state shall be registered, unless it is exempt from regis-
tration as provided for in Section 73-18-9 
(b) A person may not place, or give permission for the 
placement of, a motorboat or sailboat on any waters of 
this state or operate or give permission for the operation 
of a motorboat or sailboat on the waters of this state, 
unless the motorboat or sailboat is registered m accor-
dance with this chapter or is exempt from registration as 
provided for m Section 73-18-9 
(2) (a) The owner of each motorboat or sailboat required to 
be registered by this state shall file an application for 
registration with the division on forms approved by the 
division 
(h) d) The application shall be signed by the owner of 
the motorboat or sailboat and accompanied by a fee 
set bv the board 
(n) This fee may not exceed $10 per year 
(c> The division, before issuing a registration card and 
registration decals, shall require from each applicant a 
certificate from the county assessor of the county in which 
the motorboat or sailboat has situs for taxation containing 
one of the following statements 
d) the property tax on the motorboat or sailboat for 
the current year has been paid, 
(u) in the county assessor's opinion, the property 
tax is a lien on real property sufficient to secure the 
payment of the property tax; or 
(in) the motorboat or sailboat is exempt by law 
from payment of property tax for the current year 
(3) (a) Upon receipt of the application m the approved 
form, the division shall record the receipt and issue to the 
applicant registration decals and a registration card 
which state the number assigned to the motorboat or 
sailboat and the name and address of the owner 
(b) The registration card shall be available for inspec-
tion on the motorboat or sailboat for which it was issued, 
whenever that motorboat or sailboat is in operation 
(4) The assigned number shall 
(a) be painted or permanently attached to each side of 
the forward half of the motorboat or sailboat, 
(b) consist of plain vertical block characters not less 
than three inches m height, 
(c) contrast with the color of the background and be 
distinctly visible and legible, 
(d) have spaces or hyphens equal to the width of a 
letter between the letter and numeral groupings, and 
(e) read from left to right 
(5) Any vessel with a valid marine document issued by the 
United States Coast Guard is exempt from the number display 
requirements of Subsection (4) 
(6) The nonresident owner of any motorboat or sailboat 
already covered by a valid number, which has been assigned to 
it pursuant to federal law or a federally-approved numbering 
system of his resident state, shall be exempt from registration 
while operating the motorboat or sailboat on the waters of this 
state unless he is opera ting m excess of the reciprocity period 
provided for in Subsection 73-18-9(1) 
(7) (a) If the ownership of a motorboat or sailboat changes, 
a new application form with the fee shall be filed with the 
division and a new registration card and registration 
decals shall be issued in the same manner as provided for 
in Subsections (2) and (3) 
(b) The current number assigned to the vessel shall be 
reassigned to the new owner to display on the motorboat 
or sailboat 
(8) If the United States Coast Guard has m force an overall 
system of identification numbering for motorboats or sailboats 
within the United States, the numbering system employed 
under this chapter by the board shall be m conformity with 
that system 
(9) The division may authorize any person to act as its 
agent for the registration of motorboats and sailboats Any 
number assigned and any registration card and registration 
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decals issued by an agent of the division in conformity with 
this chapter and rules of the board shall be valid. 
(10) (a) All records of the division made or kept pursuan t to 
this section shall be classified by the Motor Vehicle 
Division in the same manne r as motor vehicle records are 
classified under Section 41-la-116. 
(b) Division records are available for inspection in the 
same manne r as motor vehicle records pursuant to Sec-
tion 41-la-116. 
(11) Each registration, registration card, and decal issued 
under this chapter shall continue in effect for a period set by 
the board. A registration may be renewed by the owner in the 
same manner provided for in the initial application. The 
current number assigned to the vessel shall be reassigned 
when the registration is renewed. 
(12) The board shall fix a day and month of the year on 
which registrations, registration cards, and registration de-
cals expire. 
(13) (a) The owner shall notify the division of the transfer 
of all or any pa r t of his interest, other than creation of a 
security interest , in a motorboat or sailboai registered in 
this s ta te under Subsections (2) and (3) or of the destruc-
tion or abandonment of the motorboat or sailboat. 
(b) This notification mus t take place within 15 days of 
the transfer, destruction, or abandonment. 
(c) The transfer, destruction, or abandonment of a 
motorboat or sailboat terminates its registration except if 
a transfer of a par t interest which does not affect the 
owner's r ight to operate a motorboat or sailboat, the 
transfer shall not terminate the registration. 
(14) (a) The registered owner shall notify the division 
within 15 days if his address changes from the address 
appearing on the registration card and shall, as a par t of 
this notification, furnish the division with his new ad-
dress. 
(b) The board may provide in its rules for the surrender 
of the registration card bearing the former address and its 
replacement with a new registration card bearing the new 
address, or for the alteration of an outstanding registra-
tion card to show the new address of the holder. 
(15) (a) If the registration card is lost or stolen, a fee of $4 
may be collected by the division for the issuance of a 
duplicate. 
(b) If the registration decals are lost or stolen, a fee of 
$3 may be collected by the division for the issuance of 
duplicate decals. 
(16) A number other than the number assigned to a motor-
boat or sailboat or a number for a motorboat or sailboat 
granted reciprocity under this chapter may not be painted, 
attached, or otherwise displayed on either side of the bow of a 
motorboat or sailboat. 
(17) A motorboat or sailboat registration and number shall 
be invalid if obtained by knowingly falsifying an application 
for registration. 
(18) The board may: 
(a) designate the suffix to assigned numbers; 
(b) adopt rules for the display of registration decals; 
(c) adopt rules for the issuance and display of dealer 
numbers and registrations; and 
(d) adopt rules for the issuance and display of tempo-
rary registrations. 1993 
73-18-7.1. Fraudulent application for registration or 
certificate of title. 
A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(1) fraudulently uses a false or fictitious name in any 
application for a registration or certificate of title for a 
motorboat, sailboat, or outboard motor; or 
(2) in making an application specified in Subsection (1), 
he: 
(a) knowingly makes a false statement; 
(b) knowingly conceals a material fact; or 
(c) otherwise commits a fraud. 1990 
73-18-7.2. Falsified registration or certificate of title. 
It is a third degree felony for any person to: 
(1) al ter with fraudulent intent any motorboat or sail-
boat certificate of title, registration card, or registration 
decal or outboard motor certificate of title issued by the 
division or its authorized agent; 
(2) forge or counterfeit any motorboat or sailboat cer-
tificate of title, registration card, or registration decal or 
outboard motor certificate of title purporting to have been 
issued by the division or its authorized agent; 
(3) alter, falsify, or forge any assignment upon a motor-
boat, sailboat, or outboard motor certificate of title; or 
(4) hold or use any motorboat or sailboat certificate of 
title, registration card, or registration decal or outboard 
motor certificate of title knowing it has been altered, 
forged, or falsified. 1990 
73-18-7.3. Suspension or revocation of a registration 
or certificate of title. 
The division or its authorized agent may suspend or revoke 
the registration or certificate of title of a motorboat, sailboat, 
or outboard motor if: 
(1) the division or its authorized agent determines tha t 
the registration or certificate of title was fraudulently or 
erroneously issued; 
(2) the division or its authorized agent determines tha t 
a registered motorboat or sailboat is mechanically unfit or 
unseaworthy for operation on the waters of this s tate; 
(3) a registered motorboat or sailboat has been dis-
mant led or wrecked so tha t it loses its character as a 
vessel; 
(4) the division or its authorized agent determines tha t 
the required registration or titling fee has not been paid 
or is not paid upon reasonable notice and demand; 
(5) a registration decal or number is knowingly dis-
played upon a motorboat or sailboat other than the one for 
which the decal or number was issued; 
(6) the division or its authorized agent determines tha t 
the owner has committed any offense under this chapter 
or Title 41 , Chapter l a , Pa r t 5, involving the registration 
or certificate of title of a motorboat, sailboat, or outboard 
motor; or 
(7) the division or authorized agent is so authorized 
under any other provision of law. 1992 
73-18-7.4. Canceled, suspended, or revoked registra-
tion or certificate of title to be returned. 
If the division or its authorized agent cancels, suspends, or 
revokes the registration or certificate of title of a motorboat, 
sailboat, or outboard motor, the owner shall immediately 
return the canceled, suspended, or revoked registration card, 
registration decal, or certificate of title to the division or 
authorized agent. 1990 
73-18-8. Safety equipment required to be on board 
vessels. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(c), each vessel 
shall have, for each person on board, one personal flota-
tion device which is approved for the type of use by the 
commandant of the United States Coast Guard, 
(b) Each personal flotation device shall be: 
(i) in serviceable condition; 
(ii) legally marked with the United States Coast 
Guard approval number; and 
(iii) of an appropriate size for the person for whom 
it is intended. 
B-7 
73-18-8.1 WATER AND IRRIGATION 78 
(c) (i) Sailboards are exempt from the provisions of 
Subsection (l)(a). 
(ii) The board may exempt certain types of vessels 
from the provisions of Subsection (l)(a) under certain 
conditions or upon certain waters. 
(d) The board may require by rule for personal flotation 
devices to be worn: 
(i) while a person is on board a certain type of 
vessel; 
(ii) by a person under a certain age; or 
(iii) on certain waters of the state. 
(e) For vessels 16 feet cr more in length, there shall 
also be on board, one Type IV throwable personal flotation 
device which is approved for this use by the commandant 
of the United States Coast Guard. 
(2) Each vessel shall display navigation lights when the 
vessel is on the waters of this state between sunset and 
sunrise. 
(3) If a vessel is not entirely open and it carries or uses any 
flammable or toxic fluid in any enclosure for any purpose, the 
vessel must be equipped with an efficient natural or mechani-
cal ventilation system which is capable of removing resulting 
gases prior to and during the time the vessel is occupied by 
any person. 
(4) Each vessel shall have fire extinguishing equipment on 
board. 
(5) Any inboard gasoline engine shall be equipped with a 
carburetor backfire flame control device. 
(6) The board may: 
(a) require additional safety equipment by rule; and 
(b) adopt rules conforming with the requirements of 
this section which govern specifications for and the use of 
safety equipment. 
(7) A person may not operate or give permission for the 
operation of a vessel which is not equipped as required by this 
section or rules promulgated under this section. 1995 
73-18-8.1. Capacity and certification label. 
(1) Each vessel manufactured after November 1, 1972, 
which is less than 20 feet in length, except a sailboat, canoe, 
kayak, inflatable vessel, or homemade motor boat must have a 
United States Coast Guard capacity and certification label 
permanently affixed to the vessel and clearly visible to the 
operator when boarding or operating the vessel. The capacity 
and certification information may be combined together and 
displayed on one label. 
(2) No person shall operate, or give permission for the 
operation of, any vessel on the waters of this state if it is 
loaded or powered in excess of the maximum capacity infor-
mation on the United States Coast Guard capacity label. 
(3) No person shall alter, deface, or remove any United 
States Coast Guard capacity or certification information label 
affixed to a vessel. 
(4) No person shall operate, or give permission for the 
operation of, a vessel on the waters of this state if the required 
United States Coast Guard capacity or certification informa-
tion label has been altered, defaced, or removed. 1990 
73-18-9. Exemptions from registration. 
Registration under this chapter is not required for any of the 
following: 
(1) a motorboat or sailboat already covered by a valid 
registration issued by its nonresident owner's resident 
state and it has not been within this state in excess of 14 
days for the calendar year; 
(2) a motorboat or sailboat from a country other than 
the United States temporarily using the waters of this 
state; 
(3) a motorboat or sailboat whose owner is the United 
States, a state or subdivision thereof; 
(4) a ship's lifeboat; or 
(5) a motorboat or sailboat belonging to a class of 
vessels which is exempted from registration by the board 
after the board finds: 
(a) that the registration of motorboats or sailboats 
of this class will not materially aid in their identifi-
cation; and 
(b) that the United States Coast Guard has a 
numbering system applicable to the class of motor-
boats or sailboats to which the motorboat or sailboat 
in question belongs, and the motorboat or sailboat 
would also be exempt from numbering if it were 
subject to federal law. 1987 
73-18-10. Owner of boat livery — Duties. 
(1) The owner of a boat livery shall keep a record of the 
following: the name and address of the person hiring any 
vessel; the identification number of the vessel; the vessel's 
departure date and time; and the vessel's expected time of 
return. The record shall be preserved for at least one year. 
(2) Neither the owner of a boat livery nor his agent or 
employee may permit any vessel to depart from the premises 
of the boat livery unless the owner has equipped it as required 
under this chapter and unless he has advised the lessee or 
renter of the vessel of all rules promulgated under this chapter 
which the lessee or renter must obey. 1986 
73-18-11. Regulation of muffling devices. 
The board shall adopt rules for the regulating of muffling 
devices on all vessels. 1986 
73-18-12. Operation in willful or wanton disregard for 
safety deemed misdemeanor. 
No person may operate any vessel, or manipulate any water 
skis, aquaplane, or similar device in a willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property. A violation of 
this section is a class B misdemeanor. 1987 
73-18-12.1. Operating under influence — Local ordi-
nances to be consistent with chapter. 
Any ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a 
person's operation of a vessel while having alcohol in the blood 
or breath, or while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
shall be consistent with the provisions of this chapter. 1987 
73-18-12.2. Boating under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs or with high blood or breath alcohol 
content — Criminal punishment — Arrest 
without a warrant. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate a vessel on the waters of 
this state if: 
(i) the person has a blood or breath alcohol concen-
tration of .08 grams or greater, as shown by any 
chemical test given within two hours after the alleged 
operation; or 
(ii) the person is under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vessel. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol 
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negli-
gence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
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degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(4) (a) Every person who is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, how-
ever, if the person has inflicted a bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vessel in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(b) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsec-
tion (a) may be suspended. 
(5) In addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection 
(4), the court shall, upon a first conviction of a violation of this 
section: 
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with empha-
sis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 24 nor more than 50 hours; and 
(b) order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
(6) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first 
conviction under this section or under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 
73-18-12.1, the court shall, in addition to the penalties pro-
vided for in Subsection (4): 
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours, with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or 
require the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 80 nor more than 240 hours; 
and 
(b) order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(7) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a 
second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 
73-18-12.1, the court shall, in addition to the penalties pro-
vided for in Subsection (4): 
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
720 consecutive hours nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or 
require the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours; 
and 
(b) order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. 
(8) A person convicted of a violation of this section is not 
eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed 
under this section has been served. Probation or parole 
resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with Section 73-18-12.1 may not be terminated until all fines 
and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation 
costs, assessed against the convicted person, have been paid. 
(9) (a) The provisions in Subsections (5), (6), and (7) requir-
ing a sentencing court to order a convicted person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility or to obtain treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 73-18-12 that qualifies 
as a prior offense under Subsection (10). A court shall 
render the same order regarding education or treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility for a first, second, or 
subsequent conviction under Section 73-18-12 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (10), as the court 
would render for a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
of a violation of Subsection (1). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction 
under Section 73-18-12 which qualified as a prior convic-
tion under Subsection (10) is a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction 
under either Section 73-18-12 or 73-18-12.2 is considered 
a prior conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and 
any community-based or other education program pro-
vided for in this section shall be approved by the Depart-
ment of Human Services.' 
(10) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or 
no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 73-18-12 or 
of a local ordinance similar to that section adopted in 
compliance with Section 73-18-12.1 the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs 
by the defendant in connection with the offense. The 
statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which 
shows whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs 
in connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accept-
ing the plea offered under this subsection of the conse-
quences of a violation of Section 73-18-12 as follows. If the 
court accepts the defendants plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of violating Section 73-18-12, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption of 
alcohol or drugs by the defendant in connection with the 
offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the 
purposes of Subsection (9). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the peace officer has 
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although 
not in his presence, and if the peace officer has probable cause 
to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
1990 
73-18-12.3. Operating under the influence — Stan-
dards for administration and interpretation 
of chemical analysis. 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish stan-
dards for the administration and interpretation of chemical 
analysis of a person's breath including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating a vessel while under the 
influence of alcohol or with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis 
was conducted in conformance with standards established 
under Subsection (1) are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary. 1987 
73-18-12.4. Operating under the influence — Admissi-
bility of chemical test — Other evidence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating a vessel while under the 
influence of alcohol or with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of any chemical test as 
authorized in Section 73-18-12.6 are admissible as evidence. 
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(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after 
the alleged operation, the test resuk is admissible as evidence 
of the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the 
alleged operation, but the trier of fact shall determine what 
weight shall be given to the test results. 
(3) The provisions of this section do not prevent a court 
from receiving any other admissible evidence as to a defen-
dant 's blood or breath alcohol level a t the time of the alleged 
operation. 1987 
73-18-12.5. Operating under the influence — Prosecut-
ing violations of local ordinances. 
Attorneys of cities and towns may prosecute alleged viola-
tions of a local ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 
73-13-12.1. " 1987 
73-18-12.6. Operating under the influence — Implied 
consent to chemical teste for alcohol or drugs 
— Refusal to submit — Revocation of registra-
tion — Court action on revocation — Person 
incapable of refusal — Results of test avail-
able — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a vessel on the waters of this 
state is considered to have given his consent to any 
chemical test of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose 
of determining whether he was operating a vessel while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content which is statu-
torily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug, so long 
as the test is administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been 
operating a vessel while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content which is statutorily prohibited, or while under the 
influence of alcohol any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug. A peace officer shall determine which test 
shall be administered. 
(b) A person who has been requested under this section 
to submit to any chemical test of his breath, blood, or 
urine, does not have the right to select the test to be 
administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense with regard 
to taking a test requested by the peace officer, and it is not 
a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceed-
ing resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the 
requested test 
(2) If the person has been placed under arrest and has then 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more 
of the chemical tests provided in Subsection (1) and refuses to 
submit to any chemical test, the person shall be warned by the 
peace officer requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the 
test is admissible in civil or criminal proceedings as provided 
under Subsection (10)(b). Following this warning, unless the 
person immediately requests the chemical test as offered by a 
peace officer be administered, no test shall be given and the 
peace officer shall submit a sworn report, within five days 
after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the 
arrested person had been operating a vessel while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content which is statutorily prohibited, 
or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had 
refused to submit to any chemical test as set forth in Subsec-
tion (1). 
(3) Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a 
peace officer to the effect that the person has refused any 
chemical test, the division shall notify the person of the date 
and time of his hearing before the division. If at that hearing 
the division determines that the person was granted the right 
to submit to a chemical test and refused to submit to any test, 
or if the person fails t-o appear before the division as required 
in the notice, the division shall revoke the registration of any 
vessel registered in the person's name or any vessel registered 
jointly in his name and another person's name. Any registra-
tion revoked may not be renewed for a period of one year 
following the date of revocation. The division shall also assess 
against the person a fee of $25 to cover administrative costs. 
The fee must be paid before any vessel registration is renewed. 
(4) Any person whose registration has been revoked by the 
division under the provisions of this section shall have the 
right to file a petition within 30 days after the revocation for a 
hearing in the district court for the county in which the person 
resides. The court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it 
shall set the trial de novo upon ten days' written notice to the 
division and thereupon take testimony and examine the facts 
of the case and determine whether the petitioner's registra-
tion is subject to revocation under the provisions of this 
chapter. If the person obtains an unappealed court decision 
that the revocation was not proper, the fee provided in 
Subsection (3) shall be cancelled. 
(5) Any person who is unconscious, or in any other condi-
tion rendering him incapable of refusing to submit to any 
chemical test is considered not to have withdrawn the consent 
provided for in Subsection (1), and any test may be adminis-
tered whether or not the person has been arrested. 
(6) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the 
results of his test shall be made available to him. 
(7) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or 
person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request 
of a peace officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of 
determining alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not 
apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any 
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace 
officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom the 
peace officer has reason to believe is operating a vessel in 
violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at 
which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or 
criminal liability arising from it, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(8) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a 
physician of his own choosing administer any chemical test in 
addition to any test administered at the direction of the peace 
officer. The failure or inability to obtain the additional test 
does not affect admissibility of the results of any test taken at 
the direction of a peace officer, nor should it preclude or delay 
any test to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. Any 
additional test shall be administered subsequent to any test 
administered at the direction of the peace officer. 
(9) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to 
any chemical test, the person to be tested does not have the 
right to consult an attorney nor is the person permitted to 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a 
condition for the taking of any test. 
(10) (a) If a person under arrest has been requested by a 
peace officer to submit to a breath test only, and the 
person does take the breath test, the peace officer may 
request additional tests of the person's blood and urine for 
the purposes of detecting the presence of drugs or alcohol. 
(b) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to any 
chemical test under this section, evidence of refusal is 
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding 
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while 
the person was operating a vessel while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and 
any drug. 1996 
73-18-12.7. Operating under the influence — Seizure 
and impoundment of vessel. 
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vessel 
for violating Section 73-18-12.2 or a local ordinance similar to 
Section 73-18-12.2, which complies with Section 73-18-12.1, 
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the peace officer shall seize and impound the vessel. If neces-
sary for transportation of the vessel for impoundment, the 
vessel's trailer may be used to transport the vessel. 
(2) If a registered owner of the vessel, other than the driver, 
is present at the time of arrest, the peace officer may release 
the vessel to that registered owner, but only if: 
(a) the registered owner* 
(i) requests removal of the vessel from the scene: 
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identifi-
cation to prove ownership of the vessel; and 
(iii) would not, in the judgment of the peace officer, 
be in violation of Section 73-18-12.2 or a local ordi-
nance adopted in compliance with Section 73-18-12.1. 
if permitted to operate the vessel; and 
(b) the vessel is legally operable. 
(3) (a) Any peace officer who impounds a vessel under this 
section shall remove, or cause the vessel to be removed, to 
the nearest accessible docking area, public or private 
garage, state impound lot, or other approved storage 
facility that meets the standards set by rule by the Motor 
Vehicle Division of the State Tax Commission, or if there 
is none, another reasonably safe place. The standards set 
by the Motor Vehicle Division shall be fair and reasonable 
and shall be unrestrictive as to the number of docking or 
other impoundment areas per geographical area. 
(b) The peace officer or agency by whom the peace 
officer is employed shall within 24 hours after the seizure 
notify the Motor Vehicle Division of the seizure and 
impoundment. The notice shall set forth: 
(i) the operator's name; 
(ii) a description of the vessel, its identification 
number, if any, and its assigned number; 
(iii) the date, time, and place of impoundment: 
(iv) the reason for impoundment; and 
(v) the location of the dock or other place where the 
vessel is stored. 
(4) Upon receipt of the notice, the Motor Vehicle Division 
ball give notice to the registered owner of the vessel in the 
ime manner as prescribed for vehicles by Section 41-la-114. 
he notice shall: 
(a) set forth: 
(i) the date, time, and place of impoundment; 
(ii) the name of the person operating the vessel at 
the time of seizure; 
(iii) the reason for seizure and impoundment; and 
(iv) the location where the vessel is stored; 
(b) inform the registered owner tha t he is responsible 
for payment of transportation charges, impound fees, and 
storage fees charged against the vessel; and 
(c) inform the registered owner of the vessel of the 
conditions prescribed in Subsection (5) which must be 
satisfied before the vessel may be released. 
(5) (a) The impounded vessel shall be released after the 
registered owner or the owner's agent: 
(i) makes a claim for release of the vessel at an> 
state office designated by the Motor Vehicle Division; 
(ii) pays an impound fee of $25; 
(iii) presents identification sufficient to prove own-
ership of the impounded vessel; and 
(iv) pays all transportation, impound, and storage 
fees. 
(b) The transportation and storage fees shall be paid to 
the docking area or other storage facility where the vessel 
is stored. All impound fees assessed under this subsection 
are dedicated revenue to the Motor Vehicle Division. 
(6) (a) Any impounded vessel not claimed by the registered 
owner or the owner's agent within 30 days shall be sold in 
accordance with the procedures specified in Section 41-
la-1103 for the sale of impounded motor vehicles. 
(bj The proceeds, if any, shall be disposed of in the 
manner specified in Section 41-la-1104. 
(c) The date of impoundment is considered the date of 
seizure for purposes of computing the time period. 
(7) (a) Transportation and storage fees shall be established 
by the Motor Vehicle Division and shall be reviewed by 
the Motor Vehicle Division annually to ensure equity for 
vessel owners and transportation and storage operators. 
(b) Transportation, impound fees, or storage fees are a 
lien on the vessel. 
(8) The registered owner of the vessel, upon the payment of 
all fees and charges incurred in the seizure and impoundment 
of the owner's vessel, has a cause of action for all the fees and 
charges, together with damages, court costs, and attorney 
fees, against the operator of the vessel whose actions caused 
the impoundment. 
(9) Liability may not be imposed upon any peace officer, the 
state, or any of its political subdivisions on account of the 
enforcement of this section. 1992 
73-18-12.8. O p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e inf luence — Removal 
o r i m p o u n d m e n t of veh ic l e used to tow im-
p o u n d e d vesse l . 
A vehicle used to tow a vessel which is impounded under 
this chapter may be removed under the provisions of Subsec-
tion 41-6-44.30(2), but if no person is able to move the vehicle 
under that section, the vehicle may be impounded if leaving it 
unattended is contrary to the safety of the public. 1987 
73-18-13. Duties of operator involved in acc ident — 
Notification a n d report ing procedures — Use 
of a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s — Giving false informa-
tion a s misdemeanor. 
(1) It is the duty of the operator of a vessel involved in an 
accident, if he can do so without seriously endangering his 
own vessel, crew, or passengers, to render aid to those affected 
by the accident as may be practicable. The operator shall also 
give his name, address, and identification of his vessel in 
writing to any person injured or to the owner of any property 
damaged in the accident. 
(2) The board shall adopt rules governing the notification 
and reporting procedure for vessels involved in accidents. 
Such rules shall be consistent with federal requirements. 
(3) All accident reports shall be for the confidential use of 
the division or other state agencies having use for the records 
for accident prevention purposes, except that the division may 
disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when 
the person's identity is not otherwise known or when the 
person denies his presence a t the accident. No report shall be 
used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an 
accident, except that the division shall furnish upon demand 
of any person who has, or claims to have, made the report or, 
upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a 
specified accident report has or has not been made to the 
division solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply 
with the requirement tha t a report be made to the division. 
Reports may be used as evidence when necessary to prosecute 
charges filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (4). 
(4) Any person who gives false information, knowingly or 
having reason to believe it is false, in an oral or written report 
as required in this chapter, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
1987 
73-18-14. T r a n s m i t t a l of information to official or 
a g e n c y of U n i t e d S t a t e s . 
In accordance with any request duly made by an authorized 
official or agency of the United States, any information com-
piled or otherwise available to the division under Subsection 
73-18-13(2) shall be transmitted to the official or agency of the 
United States. 1986 
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73-18-15. Board to adopt rules concerning water ski-
ing and aquaplane riding and use of other 
devices towed behind a vessel. 
The board shall adopt rules for the regulation and safety of 
water skiing and aquaplane riding, and the use of other 
devices which are towed behind a vessel. 1986 
73-18-15.1. Promulgation of vessel navigation and 
steering rules. 
The board may promulgate vessel navigation and steering 
rules for the waters of the state. 1987 
73-18-15.2. Minimum age of operators without super-
vision — Exception — Fee for safety course. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person under 
16 years of age may operate a motorboat on the waters of 
this state, if he is accompanied by a person who is at least 
18 years of age. 
(b) A person under 16 years of age may operate a 
sailboat, if he is under the direct supervision of a person 
who is at least 18 years of age. 
(2) A person under 16 years of age and 12 years of age or 
older may operate a personal watercrafl provided he: 
(a) is under the direct supervision of a person who is at 
least 18 years of age; 
(b) completes a boating safety course approved by the 
division; and 
(c) has in his possession a boating safety certificate 
issued by the boating safety course provider. 
(3) A person under 18 years of age and 16 years of age or 
older may operate a personal watercrafl, if he: 
(a) completes a boating safety course approved by the 
division; and 
(b) has in his possession a boating safety certificate 
issued by the boating safety course provider. 
(4) A person under Subsection (3)(a) need not be accompa-
nied by a parent, guardian, or responsible party while com-
pleting a boating safety course. 
(5) As used in this section, "direct supervision" means 
oversight at a distance within which visual contact is main-
tained. 
(6) (a) The division may collect a fee not to exceed $12 from 
each person who takes the division's boating safety course 
to help defray the cost of the boating safety course. 
(b) Money collected from the fee collected under Sub-
section (a) shall be deposited in the Boating Account. 
73-18-16. Regattas, races, exhibitions — Rules. 
The division may authorize the holding of regattas, motor-
boat or other boat races, marine parades, tournaments, or 
exhibitions on any waters of this state. The board may adopt 
rules concerning the safety of vessels and persons, either as 
observers or participants. 1987 
73-18-17. Scope of application of chapter — Identical 
local ordinances authorized — Application 
for special local rules. 
(1) This chapter, and other applicable laws of this state 
govern the operation, equipment, and numbering of vessels 
whenever any vessel is operated on the waters of this state, or 
when any activity regulated by this chapter takes place on the 
waters of this state. Nothing in this chapter prevents the 
adoption of any ordinance or local law relating to operation 
and equipment of vessels, the provisions of which are identical 
to the provisions of this chapter, amendments to this chapter, 
and rules promulgated under this chapter. Ordinances or local 
laws shall be operative only so long as and to the extent that 
they continue to be identical to provisions of this chapter, 
amendments to this chapter, and rules promulgated under 
this chapter. 
(2) Any political subdivision of this state may, at any time, 
but only after public notice, formally apply to the board for 
special rules concerning the operation of vessels on any waters 
within its territorial limits. The political subdivision shall set 
forth in the application the reasons wThich make special rules 
necessary or appropriate. 1987 
73-18-18. Liability of owner for injury or damage occa-
sioned by negligent operation of vessel by 
minor. 
The owner of a vessel shall be liable for any injury or 
damage occasioned by the negligent operation of such vessel, 
by a minor under the age of 18 years operating such vessel 
with the express or implied consent of the owner, whether 
under the laws of this s ta te or by neglecting to observe such 
ordinary care and such operation as the rules of common law 
require. 1961 
73-18-19. Publication of rules and regulations. 
The rules promulgated under this chapter shall be pub-
lished as required by Title 63, Chapter 46a, the Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act. 1987 
73-18-20. Enforcement of chapter — Authority to stop 
and board vessels — Disregarding law en-
forcement signal to stop as misdemeanor —• 
Procedure for arrest. 
(1) Any law enforcement officer authorized under Title 77, 
Chapter la, may enforce the provisions of this chapter and the 
rules promulgated under this chapter. 
(2) Any law enforcement officer authorized under Title 77, 
Chapter la, has the authority to stop and board any vessel 
subject to this chapter, whether the vessel is on water or land. 
If that officer determines the vessel is overloaded, unseawor-
thy, or the safety equipment required by this chapter or rules 
of the board is not on the vessel, that officer may prohibit the 
launching of the vessel or stop the vessel from operating. 
(3) An operator who, having received a visual or audible 
signal from a law enforcement officer authorized under Title 
77, Chapter la, to bring his vessel to a stop, operates his vessel 
in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere 
with or endanger the operation of any vessel or endanger any 
person, or who attempts to flee or elude the officer whether by 
vessel or otherwise is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(4) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of the 
provisions of this chapter or of the rules promulgated under 
this chapter, the procedure for arrest is the same as outlined 
in Sections 41-6-166 through 41-6-169. 1987 
73-18-20.1. Seizure of a vessel. 
(1) A peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of a vessel: 
(a) that is placed or being operated on the waters of 
this state with improper registration; 
(b) that the peace officer has reason to believe has been 
stolen; 
(c) on which any hull identification number or serial 
number for an engine or outboard motor has been defaced, 
altered, or obliterated; 
(d) that has been abandoned on public land, highways, 
or waters of this state; or 
(e) if the registration or title fees for the vessel or 
outboard motor have not been paid. 
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a seized vessel, the 
vessel's trailer may be seized to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vessel 
under this section shall immediately notify the Motor Vehicle 
Division of the State Tax Commission of the action and shall 
impound the vessel at a docking area, public or private garage, 
state impound lot, or other storage facility approved by the 
Motor Vehicle Division. 1990 
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73-18-20.2. Release and sa le of a se ized vessel . 
(1) A vessel seized under Section 73-18-20.1 shall remain 
impounded until: 
(a) the vessel's registration has been properly com-
pleted and the appropriate fees have been paid; or 
(b) the ownership of the vessel is established to the 
satisfaction of the division or its authorized agent. 
(2) If the hull identification number or serial number for 
the engine or outboard motor has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated, the vessel may not be released until: 
(a) the original manufacturer's hull identification num-
ber or engine or outboard motor serial number has been 
replaced; or 
(b) a new number assigned by the division or its 
authorized agent has been provided and has been affixed 
to the vessel, engine, or outboard motor. 
(3) (a) Any seized vessel not claimed by the registered 
owner or the owner's agent within 30 days shall be sold 
and handled in accordance with the procedures specified 
in Sections 41-la-1103 through 41-la-1106 for the sale of 
impounded motor vehicles. 
(b) The proceeds, if any, shall be disposed of in the same 
manner as under Section 41-la-1104. 
(c) Transportation, impound fees, or storage fees are a 
lien on the vessel. 1992 
73-18-20.3. Falsified hull identification, engine, or mo-
tor number. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) with fraudulent intent defaces, destroys, or alters a 
vessel hull identification number or serial number for an 
engine or outboard motor; 
(b) places or stamps any vessel hull identification num-
ber upon a vessel or serial number upon an engine or 
outboard motor, except one assigned by the division or its 
authorized agent; 
(c) knowingly buys, receives, disposes of, sells, offers 
for sale, or has in his possession any vessel, or engine or 
outboard motor removed from a vessel, from which the 
vessel hull identification number or engine or outboard 
motor serial number, has been removed, defaced, covered, 
altered, or destroyed for the purpose of concealing or 
misrepresenting the identity of the vessel, engine, or 
outboard motor; 
(d) with intent to procure or pass title to a vessel or 
outboard motor, receives or transfers possession of a 
vessel or outboard motor which he knows or has reason to 
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken; or 
(e) has in his possession a vessel or outboard motor 
which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen 
or unlawfully taken, unless the person is a peace officer 
engaged a t the time in the performance of his duty. 
(2) (a) This section does not prohibit the restoration by an 
owner of an original vessel hull identification number or 
manufacturer's serial number for an engine or outboard 
motor if the restoration is made by application to the 
division or its authorized agent. 
(b) This section does not prohibit any manufacturer 
from placing, in the ordinary course of business, numbers 
or marks upon vessels, motors, outboard motors, or parts . 
1990 
73-18-20.4. Duty to report falsified vessel or motor 
number. 
Any person owning or operating a marina, marine dealer-
ship, service station, public garage, paint shop, or a vessel 
repair shop shall immediately notify the local police authori-
ses of any vessel or outboard motor that has any numbers that 
bave apparently been altered, obliterated, or removed. 1990 
73-18-20.5. Report ing of theft and r e cove ry of vesse ls . 
(1) (a) Any peace officer upon receiving reliable informa-
tion tha t any vessel or outboard motor has been stolen 
shall immediately report the theft to the Law Enforce-
ment and Technical Services Division of the Department 
of Public Safety. 
(b) Any peace officer upon receiving information that 
any vessel or outboard motor which was previously re-
ported as stolen has been recovered shall immediately 
report the recovery to his law enforcement agency and to 
the Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division. 
(2) The reporting and recovery procedures for vessels and 
outboard motors shall be the same as those specified in 
Section 41-la-1401 for motor vehicles. 1993 
73-18-20.6. Report by owners or l ienholders of thefts 
and recoveries. 
(1) The owner, or person having a lien or encumbrance upon 
a registered vessel or outboard motor which has been stolen or 
embezzled, may notify the law enforcement agency having 
jurisdiction where the theft or embezzlement occurred. If a 
vessel or outboard motor was embezzled, a report may be 
made only after having procured the issuance of a warrant for 
the arrest of the person charged with embezzlement. 
(2) Any person who has given any notice under Subsection 
(1) shall notify the law enforcement agency where the theft or 
embezzlement was reported of a recovery of the vessel or 
outboard motor. 1990 
73-18-20.7. Unlawful control over vessels — Penal t ies 
— Effect of prior consent — Accessory or 
accomplice . 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over a 
vessel, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful 
custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner or 
lawful custodian of possession of the vessel, is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third degree felony if 
the actor does not return the vessel to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of unauthorized 
control. 
(3) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a vessel to 
its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a 
previous occasion to the control of the vessel by the same or a 
different person. 
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to 
or an accomplice in, an unauthorized taking or operating of a 
vessel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1990 
73-18-21. Violation of chapter as c lass B misdemeanor. 
Unless otherwise specified, any person who violates any 
provision of this chapter or rule promulgated under this 
chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1987 
73-18-22. Funds collected — Disposit ion. 
All registration fees and related moneys collected by the 
division, or any authorized agent, shall be deposited in the 
Boating Account as restricted revenue in the General Fund of 
the state, less the costs of collecting motorboat and sailboat 
registration fees by any authorized agent. The amount re-
tained by an authorized agent may not exceed 20% of the fees 
charged in Section 73-18-7. The balance of the moneys may be 
used for the construction, improvement, operation, and main-
tenance of state-owned boating facilities, for boater education, 
and for the payment of the costs and expenses of the division 
in administering and enforcing this chapter. 1990 
73-18-23. Separabil ity clause. 
If any provision of this act, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
rest of this act shall not be affected thereby. 1961 
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